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Expert Opinion and Reform in Anglo-
American, Continental, and Israeli
Adjudication
By NEIL NETANEL WEINSTOCK
Associate, Yigal Arnon & Co., Israel; Member of California and Israel Bar
Associations; J.D., 1980, Boalt Hall School of Law (University of California at
Berkeley); B.A., 1976, Yale University.
It is not proper for a judge to make statements to the effect that he
is not qualified to try the cases upon which he is adjudicating. The
reasons are obvious; such statements tend to damage public confidence
in the judges.'
[J]udges are, for the most part, "technically illiterate" and I cer-
tainly include myself in that category. But whatever our limitations,
the judiciary is increasingly being asked to grapple with scientific and
technological issues of great complexity.
2
Fact determination is the most basic and essential task of any system
of adjudication. The vast bulk of day-to-day adjudication consists of the
resolution of factual disputes, rather than the resolution of legal issues.
Even at the appellate level, judicial understanding of the factual frame-
work of the litigation is critical to a reasoned determination of the out-
standing legal issues of first impression.
Adjudicatory fact determination, however, has become increasingly
problematic. The substantial growth in litigation that involves complex
scientific and technological issues has ushered in a significant increase in
the number of factual disputes that are beyond the comprehension of the
lay or professional trier of fact. At the same time, modem technological
sophistication has brought demands for greater precision and accounta-
bility in decision-making in the courts and other public institutions. Ac-
cordingly, the credibility of the judicial system today increasingly
depends upon its ability to assess complex factual issues in a reasonably
1. S. SHETREET, JUDGES ON TRIAL 300 (1976).
2. Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REV.
817, 817 (1977) (footnote omitted). The author is the former Chief Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
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accurate manner.3
Traditionally, courts have been apprised of technical issues by per-
sons with specialized knowledge of the issue in question.' However, the
introduction into the adjudicatory process of an expert whose guidance is
required for the determination of factual issues poses a challenge to tradi-
tional notions regarding the respective roles of the judge, jury, witness,
and litigant. Advances in science and technology have resulted in a sig-
nificant increase in the use of experts and a widening gap between the
complexities of expert knowledge and the level of understanding of the
3. In the United States, for example, even long-standing supporters of the right to abor-
tion called the Supreme Court to task for the lack of scientific basis for its seminal decision,
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The decision limited state interference with a woman's
right to abortion prior to the point in which the fetus is independently "viable":
The Court's response here is simply not adequate. It agrees, indeed it holds,
that after the point of viability (a concept it fails to note will become even less clear
than it is now as the technology of birth continues to develop) the interest in protect-
ing the fetus is compelling. Exactly why that is the magic moment is not made clear:
Viability, as the Court defines it, is achieved some six to twelve weeks after quicken-
ing. (Quickening is the point at which the fetus begins discernibly to move indepen-
dently of the mother and the point that has historically been deemed crucial-to the
extent any point between conception and birth has been focused on). But no, it is
viability that is constitutionally critical: the Court's defense seems to mistake a defi-
nition for a syllogism.
Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 924
(1973) (footnotes omitted).
In another context, a commentator discussing Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Com-
puter Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), was more
generous in describing the court's failure to understand the applicable technology:
In its commendable attempt to come to grips with the pertinent technology, the
district court may have labored under certain misapprehensions. The most persis-
tent, which permeated the opinion and caused the court much unnecessary effort and
even anguish, arose from confusion between protection of the physical structure and
configuration of the chip on the one hand, and protection of the information embod-
ied in it on the other .... Of no import was the confusion between source code and
assembly code.... [T]he confusion between a bit and a byte ... and the statement
that a RAM loses its information when power is withdrawn.
I. D. BENDER, COMPUTER LAW § 4.04[1], at 4-27 n.40 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
4. In administrative law this is also accomplished, in part, by the reliance upon agency
expertise. Thus, in the United States, courts will take a "hard look" to determine if the agency
has justified its decision by offering reasoned explanations, responding to comments, examining
alternatives, and addressing the evidence in the record, but will not undertake substantive
review per se. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29 (1983). Likewise, under French administrative law, administrative courts considerably
relax their scope of review over technical matters which they consider themselves incapable of
reviewing. Bermann, The Scope of Judicial Review in French Administrative Law, 16 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 195, 232-33 (1977).
5. See, e.g., Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony,
15 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1901), discussing the inability of the average jury to assess the conflict-
ing testimony of partisan experts called by the litigants.
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average trier of fact. These developments have increased attention to the
longstanding problems of what is the proper role of the expert and how
to convey expert opinion in an adjudicatory context.
This Article compares the role of the expert in the context of the
ideology and process of fact determination in both common-law and
civil-law judicial systems. The two systems are strikingly dissimilar in
their procedures for fact determination and in what has been termed
their "legal culture," that is, their deeply rooted attitudes concerning the
nature of law and the proper structure and operation of a legal system.
6
Given the dissimilarities, each system treats the expert differently, and
the expert's role in adjudicatory fact determination has raised different
problems. Dissatisfaction with the treatment of the expert has prompted
many proposals for reform within both the common-law and civil-law
systems. The manner in which each system has responded to the prob-
lem of expert opinion may indicate both the constraints and propensities
for reform posed by each system's "legal culture." The problem of the
expert is thus an example, and perhaps a model, of how each system
responds to pressure for change.
This Article also addresses the issue of expert opinion in the context
of how diverse judicial systems respond to pressure for reform, and in
particular to pressure for reform fueled by rapid technological develop-
ment. The Article's focus is upon what the treatment of the expert may
reveal about judicial systems. It does not seek to propose solutions to the
problem of expert opinion in adjudication.
Part I of this Article briefly examines fact determination and its ide-
ology in common-law England and the United States, on the one hand,
and in civil-law France, Germany, and Italy, on the other. Part II ad-
dresses the expert's role and some problems that the use of the expert
raises within these common-law and civil-law systems. Part II also de-
scribes proposed reforms concerning the treatment of the expert in these
systems. Part III examines the role of the expert in Israel, which com-
bines elements of common-law and civil-law approaches to expert opin-
ion. Finally, this Article analyzes each system's response to the
widespread dissatisfaction with the treatment of the expert. In so doing
the Article examines the relationship between prevailing attitudes regard-
ing the nature of adjudication and the response to pressure for the reform
of adjudicatory procedures.
6. Merryman, On the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and the Common
Law, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 357, 382 (1981).
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I. THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF
ADJUDICATORY FACT DETERMINATION
Adjudication is a highly specialized and stylized procedure for de-
termining facts. Unlike scientific or other empirical analysis, the purpose
of adjudication is not to determine facts per se, but rather to resolve dis-
putes and further social policies.7 Accordingly, modem judicial systems
have been structured by historical events, political pressures, and ideolo-
gies that only partially reflect different approaches of how best to arrive
at the truth of the matter before the court. The rules and procedures for
adjudicating facts both reflect and, to a large extent, determine prevailing
attitudes regarding the respective roles of the judge, jury, and litigants,
and the judicial system as a whole vis-i-vis other governmental decision-
making bodies.
A. Common-Law Adjudication
The traditional common-law procedure for adjudicating disputes is
a "trial" in which the litigants meet in a ritualized oral contest, the out-
come of which is determined by a body of laypersons. The judge in this
public contest is a neutral umpire, whose role is to ensure that each of the
parties receives a fair opportunity to present the evidence and argue the
case. The litigants have the exclusive responsibility and right to put on
their case and to attack the position of their opponent. The jury has
absolute discretion to decide which side has met its burden of proof, it is
accountable to no one to explain or justify its decision.
Of overall importance is the oral and concentrated nature of the
proceeding. Evidence is presented and contested in a single hearing by
the oral examination and cross-examination of witnesses. The jury,
whose members are theoretically free of any preconceptions or prior
knowledge of the subject matter of the litigation, determines the facts
solely on the basis of the witnesses' demeanor and the content of their
testimony.
Common-law adjudication is above all a public ritual, which in its
openness and drama is deemed to epitomize individualized justice. As
noted by one British judge:
The British . . . say that justice should not only be done but
7. See Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 1329 (1971) (common law); 2 M. PLAINIOL, TRAITf ELfiMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL
No. 36 (11th ed. 1939) (civil law). For a critical view of what the author claims is a lack of
sufficient regard for finding the truth in common-law adjudication, see Frankel, The Search for
Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975).
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should be seen to be done, and the English system observes this precept
in the spirit and in the letter. This is in their opinion the distinguishing
mark between justice in the forum and administrative or faceless
justice.8
Likewise, as cogently expressed by one Harvard University law pro-
fessor in an article decrying the overreliance on complex mathematical
methods of proof:
[I]t would be a terrible mistake to forget that a typical lawsuit,
whether civil or criminal, is only in part an objective search for histori-
cal truth. It is also, and no less importantly, a ritual-a complex pat-
tern of gestures comprising... "society's last line of defense in the
indispensable effort to secure the peaceful settlement of social
conflicts." 9
Common-law adjudication has come to embody notions of individu-
alism and antiauthoritarianism. These notions, to a large extent, result
from and express themselves in the dominant role of laypersons in An-
glo-American dispute settlement. Since 1670, when the jurors who had
been imprisoned for acquitting William Penn in contravention of the
judge's instructions were released on habeus corpus, lay decision-makers
have enjoyed virtually unbridled power to reach verdicts in accordance
with their sentiment.10 As a result, the jury, and to a lesser extent Eng-
land's lay assessor as well, have come to represent individualized justice
and freedom from central authority. In the words of a renowned English
judge: "A jury cannot fight tyranny outside the law, but it ensures that
within the law liberty cannot be crushed."11
The antiauthoritarianism so deeply rooted in the common law, how-
ever, extends beyond the institution of the jury. In the Anglo-American
trial the parties raise the issues, introduce the evidence, and attack the
case of their opponent with relatively little interference from the judge.
In its emphasis on individual initiative, competition, and minimal intru-
sion of authority, common-law adjudication reflects the philosophy of
laissez-faire capitalism.2 Moreover, in a society increasingly governed
by administrative fiat, the judicial system is often seen as the repository
8. P. DEVLIN, THE JUDGE 58 (1979).
9. Tribe, supra note 7, at 1376 (quoting Hart & McNaughton, Evidence and Interference
in the Law, in EVIDENCE AND INTERFERENCE 48, 52 (D. Lerner ed. 1958)).
10. P. DEVLIN, supra note 8, at 118-19. Judges, of course, have made great efforts to gain
more control over the verdict by defining issues as matters of law rather than of fact and by
imposing restrictive rules of evidence.
11. Id. at 176.
12. Interestingly, the American judiciary acted as a strong proponent of laissez-faire capi-
talism, striking down much government regulation of business from the late nineteenth cen-
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of individualized justice and the guardian of the public interest in the
face of parochial and self- interested technical bureaucrats. In contrast
to "technocratic" decision-making, which consists of the mechanical ap-
plication of "cold, hard facts," law is seen to be, in the words of a United
States Court of Appeals judge, "idealistic, nontechnical, value- laden and
humanistic." 3 In this context judges have become "post-industrial he-
roes," whose very ignorance of science and technology qualifies them to
be champions of universal human values in opposition to administration
by government experts.14 As we shall see below, this romantic common-
law ideal of the judge and of the judicial system has largely determined
the treatment and function of the expert within the adjudicatory process.
The ideology and structure of the common law are a legacy of hun-
dreds of years of development, during which Anglo-American adjudica-
tion has never entirely comported with the prototypical public contest
described above. For example, United States judges have always had, to
one degree or another, the power to call witnesses on their own motion
rather than be constrained to sit as passive umpires.' 5 In addition, at the
outset of the common law, the jury was a group of persons with personal
prior knowledge of the events in question.' 6 More recently, the last two
decades have seen "a very slow drift away from the adversary system" in
which judges are becoming more active in controlling and managing liti-
gation. 17 Increased judicial "case management" has resulted from: (1)
judges' efforts to handle more efficiently their rapidly growing volume of
tury through the beginning of the New Deal as violative of essential values guaranteed by the
due process clause of the Constitution. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
13. Markey, Jurisprudence or "Juriscience"?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 525, 526-27
(1984).
14. Shapiro, JudicialActivism, in THE THIRD CENTURY 109, 125- 26 (S. Lipset ed. 1979).
15. See infra notes 67, 140.
16. The early trial jury, which began to be employed formally in England on a widespread
basis in the twelfth century, consisted in large part of witnesses to the subject of the litigation.
J. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAW JUDGES 121-24 (1960). At least initially, the kings and
judges questioned individual jurors or other witnesses to determine the credibility of their
respective versions as to the event in question. Id. Gradually, however, judges divested them-
selves of their role in assessing the evidence, apparently preferring to have a unanimous jury
reach a verdict than having to face the possibility of becoming involved with enmities and
feuds arising from their own attempts to dissect testimony and arrive at a decision. 2 F. POL-
LOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 627 (1895), quoted in J. DAWSON,
supra, at 128 n.27. This was especially true by the end of the thirteenth century. Therefore,
fact determination was left in the hands of the jury, which for centuries thereafter arrived at
verdicts on the basis of a combination of their own prior knowledge of the events in question,
what they were able to learn of the facts before or during the trial, and testimony presented at
the trial.
17. Weinstein, Rules for Courts: The Role ofLawyers, Judges, Professors and Government,
13 ISR. L. REV. 459, 473 (1978).
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work;"i (2) the granting of greater discretion to judges to admit relevant
evidence; 9 (3) the decline of the use of the jury, especially in England;
2
1
and, (4) in the United States, the creation of extensive pretrial discovery
rights and judicial supervision of discovery involving judges in pretrial
negotiation, mediation, and planning.21 Despite these developments, the
traditional common-law prototype and its accompanying ideology re-
main the reference point from which rules and procedures of common-
law fact determination evolve, and, as discussed here, continue to exert
significant influence on the treatment of expert opinion.
B. Civil-Law Adjudication
Civil-law adjudication is no more static or homogenous than its
common-law counterpart, and has been subject to varying influences of
French revolutionary ideology and German legal science, as well as mod-
em pressures for greater efficiency and accountability. Insofar as it is
possible to generalize, the law's mystique in civil-law countries lies not in
the arena of the judge, but rather in the domain of the scholar and legis-
18. Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REV. 374, 379-80 (1982).
19. This reform has resulted from half a century of widespread dissatisfaction with tradi-
tional common-law evidentiary exclusions, such as the rules against hearsay and opinion testi-
mony, which were nearly impossible to apply consistently, and which operated to deprive the
trier of fact of relevant evidence that normally would be considered in decision-making. Wig-
more, for example, in the first edition of his treatise on evidence, stated in 1904 that the opin-
ion rule "has done more than any one rule of procedure to reduce our litigation towards a state
of legalized gambling." 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1929, at 2563 (Ist ed. 1904). In the
1930s the American Law Institute considered writing a Restatement of the Law of Evidence,
but abandoned the idea because "the Rules themselves... are so defective that instead of being
the means of developing truth, they operate to surpress it." Lewis, Introduction to MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE, at viii (1942). The movement for a comprehensive reform of the law of
evidence in the United States resulted in the drafting of the Model Code of Evidence in 1942
and the Uniform Rules of Evidence in 1953, and the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence
in 1975. Travis, Impartial Expert Testimony Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A French
Perspective, 8 INT'L LAW. 492, 494-95 (1974). In England a series of reports conceruing the
law of evidence prepared by the Law Reform Committee culminated in the enactment of the
Civil Evidence Acts of 1968 and 1972. These codes contain numerous reforms, the general
tenor of which is to allow the judge considerably more discretion to admit evidence that will be
helpful to the trier of fact to determine the facts in issue.
20. In England the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1933, 23 &
24 Geo. 5, ch. 36, abolished the grand jury and severely curtailed the use of the trial jury in
civil cases. Today, the jury is used in less than one percent of civil cases, but is used in all
..grave" criminal cases in which there is a plea of not guilty. These cases comprise approxi-
mately four percent of all cases tried in Britain. H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 108
(4th ed. 1980).
21. Pretrial discovery has also pushed common-law adjudication away from its traditional
model by making litigation considerably less concentrated. Evidence and issues are now
presented in a series of meetings and exchanges of documents prior to the trial as well as
during the trial itself.
19861
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lator.2 2 In contrast to the dynamic of the common law, which is centered
in the drama of dispute resolution, the ideological basis of the civil law
lies in the certainty and clarity of abstract principles of law.23 For this
reason the problems of procedure and evidence are frequently ignored by
legal scholars on the Continent.24
Civil law has no antiauthoritarian ethos, such as that which charac-
terize the common law. The prevailing political ideology on the Conti-
nent has been state positivism, rather than laissez-faire capitalism, 25 and
it is the legislature, rather than the judicial system, that has traditionally
been seen to embody the popular will and the ethical values of the law.26
In addition, with the exception of the specialized area of commercial
courts, the civil law has no deeply rooted tradition of lay participation in
adjudicatory decision-making.27 Juries have never been used for civil
matters in modem Germany, France, or Italy, and lay participation is
minimal even in criminal matters.28
The civil-law lower court judge is a professional civil servant whose
essential responsibility is to elicit evidence impartially and then to deter-
mine factual issues based on that evidence. 29 The application of legal
principles to arrive at a verdict is, at least in theory, automatic, a task
22. The legal systems of France, Germany, and Italy are largely products of codification
movements and the "Romanist notion that the real law is the received scholarly tradition, and
the code and judicial decisions are merely attempts to specify and particularize that tradition."
M. SHAPIRO, COURTS, A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 146-47 (1981). See also
J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 59-64 (1969).
23. R. DAVID, FRENCH LAW 73-74 (1972). See also, J. MERRYMAN, supra note 22, at 50-
58.
24. R. DAVID, supra note 23, at 144-46 (France).
25. J. MERRYMAN, supra note 22, at 21-23.
26. Id. at 24.
27. The judges of France's commercial courts are businessmen who are elected by their
peers. P. HERZOG, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 145 (1967).
28. France and Germany imported the jury trial for criminal cases from England in 1791
and 1848-5 1, respectively. Kunert, Some Observations on the Origin and Structure of Evidence
Rules Under the Common-Law System and the Civil Law System of "Free Proof" in the Ger-
man Code of Criminal Procedure, 16 BUFFALO L. REV. 122, 145-46 (1966). Today, French
law provides for jury trials only in cases involving serious crimes and permits a verdict by
majority vote. H. ABRAHAM, supra note 20, at 117. Germany abolished the jury system in
1924 and replaced it with the use of lay judges who deliberate together with and take instruc-
tion from the career judge. Kunert, supra at 143 (quoting Mannheim, Trial by Jury in Mod-
ern Continental Criminal Law, 53 LAW. Q. REV. 99, 388 (1937)).
29. The civil-law judge enters the judiciary directly from university and is seen as a func-
tionary whose basic job it is to decide factual issues. R. DAVID, supra note 23, at 54-56, 83
(France). Moreover, in Germany, judges' salaries are often equivalent to those received by
junior ranks of the civil service. Cohn, Law of Civil Procedure in 2 MANUAL OF GERMAN
LAW 165 (2d ed. 1971).
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requiring no exercise of judicial discretion.3" Despite its apparent em-
phasis on fact determination, however, civil-law adjudication tradition-
ally has required no greater certainty or precision in determining facts
than its common-law counterpart.3" Indeed, with the exception of crimi-
nal cases, in which the judge is under a strong obligation to pursue the
objective truth,32 civil-law judges generally make factual determinations
on the basis of "the total shape or direction of the facts" and are less
concerned with factual detail and the credibility of individual witnesses
than are their common-law counterparts.33
Civil-law adjudication, which consists of a series of meetings and
written communications between counsel and judge, bears little resem-
blance to the public ritual of the common law. Civil proceedings typically
are divided into an introductory stage, in which pleadings and documen-
tary evidence are filed, an evidentiary or instructional stage, in which the
judge assigned to take the evidence collects and prepares a written sum-
mary of the materials and testimony necessary for a decision, and a deci-
sional stage, in which a three-judge panel considers the written summary
and counsel's briefs, hears oral argument, and renders a decision. 34
30. The ideal of certainty in the law, in which legislation is sufficiently clear and complete
so that its interpretation is automatic, has been described as "an expression of a desire to make
the law judge-proof." J. MERRYMAN, supra note 22, at 50. Despite this ideal, civil-law judges
have made and continue to make a good deal of law. French courts, for example, created vast
areas of tort law. See M. SHAPIRO, supra note 22, at 136- 42. Moreover, in Italy the case law
"has given rise to a system of precedent which, although not formally binding, is strictly
observed." G. CERTOMA, THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 90 (1985).
31. As stated in one treatise regarding civil procedure in France:
The proceedings employed for establishing a fact in a court of law do not always
result in creating certainty in the mind of the judge; very often the judge decides on
the basis of a simple probability; and it is that which explains judicial errors....
Certainty is rarely acquired. Proof properly so called, direct and absolute, hardly
ever exists; more often the contested point is not demonstrated, but simply rendered
probable, to a degree more or less strong. The judicial verity is therefore far from
possessing the complete certainty which attaches to solutions of the physical or
mathematical sciences. The witnesses can lie, the writing can be false, the material
evidence can be deceiving or badly understood; one is nevertheless obliged to be
content with it, because the solution of the case is a social necessity, and there are no
human means to do better.
M. PLAINIOL, supra note 7, No. 36.
32. G. CERTOMA, supra note 30, at 220.
33. Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, Phases of German Civil Procedure I, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 1193, 1237 (1958) [hereinafter Kaplan].
34. See J. MERRYMAN, supra note 22, at 120-21; G. CERTOMA, supra note 30, at 194-208
(Italian civil procedure); Kaplan, supra note 33, at 1211-12 (German civil procedure). In
France, counsel often seek to avoid the delay and expense of a proof proceeding before the
examining judge by asking the three-judge panel to rule on the basis of documentary evidence
submitted. P. HERZOG, supra note 27, at 283-84.
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Of particular importance is the mediate nature of the proceedings.
One member of the panel of three deciding judges, or even an official who
plays no role in deciding the case, receives and summarizes the evi-
dence.35 The deciding judges, therefore, determine the factual issues of
the case on the basis of documentary evidence and written summaries of
witness testimony.36 This practice descends from the procedure of medi-
eval canon law which required judges to base their decisions exclusively
on the written record of witness examination prepared by subordinate
court officials.37
The civil-law system of proof-taking is often labelled "inquisitorial,"
in contrast to the "adversarial" common-law system.38 While this char-
acterization has been criticized as misleading,39 the civil-law judge does
play a considerably more active role-than the common-law judge in the
elicitation and presentation of evidence, particularly in criminal cases. In
Germany, for example, the most frequent attack against criminal convic-
tions is that by failing to elicit further evidence possibly favorable to the
defendant, the court reaches its verdict without having adequately clari-
fied the facts." In civil cases the sole responsibility for raising issues and
introducing evidence ostensibly rests with the parties. In practice, how-
ever, the examining judge plays a significant role in developing the evi-
dence.41 The judge determines which of the witnesses nominated by the
35. In Italy, for example, the examining judge opens the decision-making stage by giving a
report setting forth the undisputed facts, the history of the proceedings, and the issues of law
and fact that are in dispute. G. CERTOMA, supra note 30, at 207. Today, the examining judge
is generally a member of the three-judge panel that decides the case. Id. Italy, until it enacted
its present civil procedure code in 1942, precluded the examining judge from serving on the
panel. Id. at 194.
36. The panel may, however, freely evaluate any evidence that the examining judge
secures and may order proof proceedings denied by the examining judge. P. HERZOG, supra
note 27, at 266 (France); G. CERTOMA, supra note 30, at 198 (Italy).
37. H. BERMANN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION 252 (1983).
38. See, e.g., P. DEVLIN, supra note 8, at 54.
39. J. MERRYMAN, supra note 22, at 124.
40. Kunert, supra note 28, at 161-62.
41. In Germany the basic principle, known as Verhandlunqsmaxime, is that the parties
must present the case and the court is restricted to the facts that the parties have placed before
it. Article 139 of the German Code of Civil Procedure, however, codifies a principle, known as
richterliche Aufkld'rungspflicht ("judicial duty to ascertain matters") which requires the court
to exert its influence on the parties to make a complete statement of all relevant facts, thus
significantly revising the basic principle. ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] art. 139. COHN,
supra note 29, at 176. The French Code of Civil Procedure contains no explicit requirement
that the judge take an active role in the elicitation of evidence, but such a duty is implied by all
of the provisions of proof-taking, which may be applied only at the discretion of the judge and
may be effected upon the initiative of the court as well as of the parties. Travis, supra note 19,
at 507-08.
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parties will be called and in what order they will appear, and may direct
that witnesses who have given conflicting testimony be called together for
a confrontation. 42 The judge personally conducts the examination of the
witnesses and is generally free to ask whatever questions he or she deems
pertinent, including questions the parties submit.43 In France and Italy
neither counsel nor the parties are permitted to question the witness di-
rectly.' 4 In Germany the court may allow the parties and must allow
counsel to examine the witness. Ordinarily, however, neither the parties
nor counsel actually pose more than a few questions since a more exten-
sive examination would be seen to imply that the court has done an un-
satisfactory job in its questioning of the witnesses. 45 Finally, as
mentioned above, the only record of a witness' testimony is the summary
dictated by the examining judge; the witness and counsel may, however,
suggest changes or request the court to record a particular part of the
testimony verbatim.46
The civil-law judge enjoys considerable freedom in evaluating evi-
dence. Civil-law courts generally may draw inferences from any factual
information submitted to them, regardless of whether such information
was furnished by permissible means of proof.4 7 In addition, all witness
statements are admissible as evidence, as long as they are relevant to the
matter at hand. There are no equivalents to the hearsay or opinion rules
that restrict the admissibility of out-of-court statements and witness in-
ferences, and judges are free to follow their "intuitive conviction" regard-
42. G. CERTOMA, supra note 30, at 206 (Italy); Kaplan, supra note 33, at 1233-34 (Ger-
many); P. HERZOG, supra note 27, at 335 (France).
43. P. HERZOG, supra note 27, at 339 (France). In Italy judges technically may not de-
part in their examination from the matters specified in writing by the party calling the witness,
but they may ask further questions "to seek a clarification of the answers or facts." G.
CERTOMA, supra note 30, at 206. In Germany the judge must ask pertinent questions formu-
lated by counsel or a party. Kaplan, supra note 33, at 1235.
44. P. HERZOG, supra note 27, at 339 (France); G. CERTOMA, supra note 30, at 206
(Italy).
45. Kaplan, supra note 33, at 1235.
46. Id. at 1235-36 (Germany); P. HERZOG, supra note 27, at 339 (France); G. CERTOMA,
supra note 30, at 206 (Italy).
47. Thus, so long as the parties submit documentary evidence to adverse parties, it may be
submitted to the court and the judge may freely draw inferences from it, even if its use as
proof is limited by law. P. HERZOG, supra note 27, at 316-19 (France); G. CERTOMA, supra
note 30, at 200 (Italy). The court may also draw inferences from oral statements that do not
constitute testimony, such as the statements of persons who are incompetent to be witnesses
and the admissions of parties. The only possible limitation, as held by the French Cour de
cassation, is that the court cannot base its decision entirely upon one inference drawn from an
otherwise inadmissible item of proof. P. HERZOG, supra note 27, at 318 (France); G.
CERTOMA, supra note 30, at 203 (Italy).
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ing probative value. 8 On the other hand, Continental civil procedure
contains vestiges of the canonist system of "legal proof,"49 including
party oaths ° and restrictions on oral testimony, such as the traditional
provision that the parties are incompetent to testify.51 These restraints
may impair the judge's ability to evaluate the evidence freely.52
There have been some halting attempts in civil-law systems to move
towards greater concentration, immediacy, and reliance on oral testi-
mony. In 1958, for example, France simplified the procedure for taking
witness testimony and gave courts greater powers to pursue facts and test
witness credibility.53 In 1942 Italy enacted a new Code of Civil Proce-
dure which radically altered several aspects of the civil process under the
1865 Code.4 The new Code provided that the civil process was to be
principally oral and concentrated into a few hearings, and introduced an
element of immediacy by including the examining judge in the adjudicat-
48. Kaplan, supra note 33, at 1237 (Germany); G. CERTOMA, supra note 30, at 205 (It-
aly); P. HERZOG, supra note 27, at 341 (France).
49. The canonist system of "legal proof," which secular courts adopted throughout Eu-
rope in the early sixteenth century, was designed to minimize the power of judges by requiring
that they mechanically apply an arithmetic method of proof in determining factual issues.
Kunert, supra note 28, at 144-45. Accordingly, the law specified the number of uncontradicted
witnesses that were required to establish various propositions and the number of witnesses of a
particular class or gender that were needed to cancel the testimony of a single witness of a
higher order. H. BERMANN, supra note 37, at 252.
50. Under the procedure of the decisory oath in France and Italy, a party may require the
opponent to swear under penalty of perjury to the truth of the opponent's version of a factual
issue. If the opponent takes the oath, the issue is settled conclusively in his or her favor. The
opponent may refer the oath back to the party who originally tendered it and will lose if the
party swears to the negative of the proposition set forth in the original oath. See P. HERZOG,
supra note 27, at 358-61 (France); G. CERTOMA, supra note 30, at 204 (Italy). In Germany the
decisory oath was abolished in 1933, but a party may propose that the opponent be called to
testify, and the court may draw inferences from the opponent's refusal to give testimony.
Kaplan, supra note 33, at 1241-42. Italy and France also provide for a "supplementary oath,"
which the court may put to one of the parties where there is some evidence in the case, but
such evidence is insufficient alone to enable the court to render a proper decision. P. HERZOG,
supra note 27, at 361 (France); G. CERTOMA, supra note 30, at 204 (Italy).
51. In France a party is incompetent to testify as a witness, but may be subjected to the
examination of the court in a procedure called comparution personnelle. Any admissions that
parties make during the course of the examination may be used against them, but their state-
ments do not constitute evidence as such. P. HERZOG, supra note 27, at 344-47. Article 246 of
the Italian Code of Civil Procedure provides that all persons who have an interest in the action
are incompetent as witnesses. CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE art. 246. Italy's Constitutional
Court, however, has declared this provision to be unconstitutional. G. CERTOMA, supra note
30, at 205. With regard to the "flourishing body of law regarding privilege in civil cases" in
Germany, see Kaplan, supra note 33, at 1237-38.
52. J. MERRYMAN, supra note 22, at 123.
53. P. HERZOG, supra note 27, at 335.
54. G. CERTOMA, supra note 30, at 194.
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ing panel.5" Italy's attempt to make its civil process oral and concen-
trated has failed in practice, however. Today civil proceedings in Italy
remain primarily a written process, comprised of a number of discon-
nected audiences. 6 Likewise, in Germany the express ideal is that of
concentration and immediacy, but in practice litigation consists of a se-
ries of hearings in which one judge takes the evidence. 7 Germany's Code
of Civil Procedure also attempts to move away from a strictly written
procedure by requiring counsel to address the court freely without refer-
ence to written pleadings,58 the only exception being if neither party ob-
jects and the court considers references to written proceedings
appropriate. 9 In practice, the exception has become the rule, and oral
argument in German civil cases tends to be merely a ritualized reference
to written pleadings.60 As discussed herein, the tenacity with which
civil-law practitioners cling to traditional conceptions of procedure in the
face of legislative efforts at reform has also impeded change with regard
to the treatment and the role of the expert.
II. THE ROLE OF THE EXPERT AND THE
TREATMENT OF EXPERT OPINION
A. The Expert in Anglo-American Adjudication
The use of experts to inform the court of matters that require spe-
cialized knowledge predates the development of the modem system of
common-law adjudication. In the early stages of trial by jury, courts in
England began to select as jurors persons who were especially qualified to
understand the factual issues before them or to call for the advice of
skilled persons whose opinions the court might adopt as it pleased. In
fourteenth-century London, trade disputes were generally brought before
a jury of men of the trade in question.6 1 In a reported case in 1645, a
court summoned a jury of merchants to try merchants' affairs "because it
was conceived they might have better Knowledge of the Matters in Dif-
ference which were to be tried, than others could, who were not of that
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Cohn, supra note 29, at 178.
58. Id. at 165. This requirement is set forth in the German Code of Civil Procedure.
ZPO § 137(1). The ZPO was promulgated in 1877 and was substantially revised in 1951.
59. Cohn, supra note 29, at 165; ZPO § 137(2).
60. Cohn, supra note 29, at 165.
61. These juries were summoned by the mayor, who also passed sentence upon their ver-
dict. Hand, supra note 5, at 41.
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Profession."62 In 1345, in an appeal of a mayhem conviction, a court
summoned surgeons for assistance in determining whether a wound was
fresh.63 Likewise, in 1494 a court called certain "masters of grammar"
to assist it in construing a bond.64
In the era before modem common-law procedure was fully devel-
oped, the calling of experts by the court posed no institutional conflict.
As set forth in 1553 by Saunders, J.:
If matters arise in our law which concern other sciences or facul-
ties we commonly apply for the aid of that science or faculty which it
concerns. This is a commendable thing in our law. For thereby it
appears that we do not dismiss all other sciences but our own, but we
approve of them and encourage them as things worthy of
commendation.
65
At some point after the sixteenth century, however, when the jury
ceased to be self-informing and began to determine facts on the basis of
witness testimony, parties began to call experts to testify on their be-
half.66 As judges increasingly assumed the role of the neutral umpire-
leaving it to the parties to present the evidence-the calling of experts as
witnesses became virtually the exclusive method for introducing expert
opinion before the court. Although English and American courts from
time to time have affirmed their inherent power to appoint their own
expert witnesses, 67 this power has been exercised rarely. Indeed, com-
mon-law judges have become firmly wedded to the concept that it is the
parties who bear the responsibility for presenting the evidence.
68
62. LILLY'S PRACTICAL REGISTER, ii.154, quoted in Hand, supra note 5, at 42-43.
63. Anonymous, Y.B. 28 Ed. 3, pl. 5 (1345), cited in Hand, supra note 5, at 42.
64. Anonymous, Y.B. 9 H. 8, fo. 16, pl. 8 (1679), cited in Hand, supra note 5, at 43.
65. Buckley v. Rice-Thomas, [1554] 1 Plowd 118, 124, quoted in R. CROSS, EVIDENCE
442 (6th ed. 1985).
66. In a 1678 murder trial, for example, the prosecution and defense each called physi-
cians to testify regarding the cause of death of the purported victim. R. v. Pembroke, 13
STATE TRIALS 1337, 1338, 1340-41 (T. Howell ed. 1699), described in Hand, supra note 5, at
46.
67. England: Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v. Levinstein, [1883] 24 Ch. D. 156; Thorn
v. Worthing Skating Rink, [1877] 6 Ch. D. 415 n.2 (1876); Colls v. Home & Colonial Stores
Ltd., 1904 A.C. 179, 192. United States: Scott v. Spanjer Bros., Inc., 298 F.2d 928 (2d Cir.
1962); Danville Tobacco Ass'n v. Bryant-Buckner Assocs., Inc., 333 F.2d 202 (4th Cir. 1964).
The power of judges to call and examine lay witnesses, as a corollary to their responsibility to
decide cases, has been asserted by Wigmore and supported in the United States, particularly
with regard to eyewitnesses in criminal cases. English judges, however, have adopted a restric-
tive attitude to the court's power to call witnesses in both criminal and civil matters. Basten,
The Court Expert in Civil Trials-A Comparative Appraisal 40 MOD. L. REV. 174, 182 (1977).
68. Basten, supra note 67, at 176, 181-83; Sink, The Unused Power of a Federal Judge to
Call His Own Expert Witness, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 195 (1956).
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At first glance, the placing of the expert in the role of a partisan
witness fits well with the overall ethos of common-law adjudication,
whereby "the dispute is between the parties, and the judge merely keeps
the ring."' 69 In practice, however, it has often proven to be a hindrance
to the presentation and assessment of technical evidence and to the just
resolution of disputes.
Although experts are called by the parties to give testimony, they
are fundamentally different from ordinary witnesses. Lay witnesses tes-
tify regarding their personal knowledge of the facts in question. They are
required, to the extent possible, merely to relate impressions and, without
stating their own opinions, to allow the finder of fact to draw inferences
from the testimony.70 Expert witnesses, on the other hand, often have no
personal knowledge whatsoever of the material facts in dispute. Their
role is to help the judge or jury draw inferences from the testimony of
ordinary witnesses. Experts' testimony, therefore, consists precisely of
their opinions regarding what inferences should be drawn from the un-
derlying evidence and, by definition, concerns itself with matters that are
beyond the scope of the judge or jury.
Because experts testify regarding their opinion and lay witnesses are
restricted in this regard, it is important to determine who qualifies as an
expert. While a few cases hold that an expert must be in "an organized
branch of knowledge, ' 71 common-law courts generally take a more lib-
eral position and require only that the witness have some knowledge or
training, whether formal or informal, which is likely to be outside the
experience and knowledge of the judge or jury.72 Thus in 1699, in Spen-
69. R. v. Dora Harris [1927] 2 K.B. 587, 590 (argument of Lord Hewart, C.J.), quoted in
Basten, supra note 67, at 181.
70. Thus, in England, until the enactment of the Civil Evidence Act of 1972, ch. 30, the
ordinary witness could not suggest what inferences should be drawn as long as the facts upon
which his or her opinion was based could be stated without reference to the opinion in a
manner equally conducive to the ascertainment of the truth. R. CRoss, supra note 65, at 437
(citing Sherrard v. Jacob, [1965] N. Ir. 151, 157-58) (Lord Macdermott). Even under the new
Act a witness may make a statement of opinion only if it is "made as a way of conveying
relevant facts personally perceived by him," and the statement is admissible only "as evidence
of what he perceived." Civil Evidence Act of 1972, ch. 30, § 3(2). Likewise, under rule 701 of
the United States Federal Rules of Evidence, enacted in 1975, the nonexpert witness may not
testify in the form of opinions or inferences unless they are "(a) rationally based on the percep-
tion of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determina-
tion of a fact in issue." FED. R. EVID. 701; see 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BEROER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE 701-1, 701-9 to -20 (1985) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN].
71. Clark v. Ryan, 103 C.L.R. 486, 501, 502 (Austl. 1960); Weal v. Bottom, 40 A.L.R.
436, 445 (Austl. 1966), cited in Eggleston, Generalizations and Experts in FACTS IN THE LAW
27 (W. Twining ed. 1983).
72. LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, SEVENTEENTH REPORT (EVIDENCE OF OPINION AND
1986]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
cer Cowper's case,73 the court allowed sailors who had been in sea fights
to testify whether a drowned body full of water would sink.74 Although
a writer commenting on the case in 1901 indicated that the sailors would
not qualify as experts in his day,7 5 today's courts, in both England and
the United States, most probably would permit the testimony, leaving it
to the trier of fact to evaluate its probative value.7 6 As set forth in a 1981
opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, "The
only thing a court should be concerned with in determining the qualifica-
tions of an expert is whether the expert's knowledge of the subject matter
is such that his opinion will likely assist the trier of fact in arriving at the
truth.
77
The question of how an expert is to function as a partisan witness is
more problematic than the problem of defining who qualifies as an ex-
pert. The "battle of the experts," in which experts serve the parties as
hired champions, has long been criticized as transforming the common-
law trial from a ritual of justice into a spectacle of confusion.78 The
presentation of conflicting expert testimony, which is beyond the knowl-
edge of the trier of fact, is apt to add to the trier's bewilderment rather
than to be of assistance in arriving at the truth. As cogently stated by
Judge Learned Hand:
[T]he whole object of the expert is to tell the jury, not facts, ....
but general truths derived from his specialized experience. But how
can the jury judge between two statements each founded upon an expe-
EXPERT EVIDENCE) 10 (1970). With regard to the knowledge of the trier of fact, the test is
"the general knowledge and experience of judges or jurors as a class," and not any idiosyn-
cratic specialized knowledge or experience of the individual judge who tries the case. Id. Rule
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that a witness may qualify as an expert by
"knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education."
73. 13 STATE TRIALS 1106-35 (T. Howell ed. 1699), discussed in Hand, supra note 5, at
46.
74. Id. at 1135.
75. Hand, supra note 5, at 46.
76. As set forth by the United Kingdom's Law Reform Committee: "[I]f the matter is one
upon which expert evidence is admissible at all, the qualifications of the expert, if he has any
specialised knowledge or experience in the matter, go to the weight of his evidence, not to its
admissibility." LAW REFORM COMMITrEE, supra note 72, at 10.
77. Mannino v. Int'l Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 846, 851 (6th Cir. 1981). Accordingly, the courts
have held that unlicensed physicians may give expert testimony with regard to standards of
medical practice, Grindstaff v. Coleman, 681 F.2d 740 (11th Cir. 1982) (although the physi-
cian was unlicensed at the time of the event, he had been licensed at the time of the trial) or the
question of informed consent, Wetherill v. Univ. of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Ill.
1983), so long as they have knowledge in these areas, but may not give testimony with regard
to a medical diagnosis. Gates v. United States, 707 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir. 1983).
78. See, e.g., Hand, supra note 5; Friedman, Expert Testimony, Its Abuse and Reforma-
tion, 19 YALE L. J. 247 (1910).
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rience confessedly foreign in kind to their own? It is just because they
are incompetent for such a task that the expert is necessary at al. 79
The traditional Anglo-American response to the problem of expert
witnesses has been to put them, to the extent possible, within the rubric
designed for the ordinary witnesses. Common- law courts have sought
in a number of ways to ensure that the expert's opinion and the facts on
which it is based may be tested by cross-examination and that the expert
not usurp the role of the trier of fact in determining the factual issues of
the litigation.
For example, although experts, unlike other witnesses, are permitted
to testify freely regarding their opinions-and indeed their opinions are
the essence of their testimony-the experts are required to set forth the
factual basis of their opinions. Theoretically, this makes sense because
the expert's opinion may be of little value to the trier of fact if the expert
assumes facts that the trier does not find to be the case. The problem
could be solved by having the trier of fact arrive at a special verdict to
determine the basic facts and then have the expert base his or her opin-
ions upon the findings in the special verdict.8 0 This approach, however,
might give the expert too strong a voice in determining the final verdict,
and it might conflict with the common-law principle that the jury must
have unrestricted freedom to rule as it wishes without having to account
for how it reaches its decison.1s
The common solution to this problem is to require counsel to lay a
foundation for the expert's opinion by reciting a litany of factual assump-
tions in questioning the expert on direct examination."2 This procedure
has been widely criticized as misleading to the jury and subject to abuse
by counsel who use the hypothetical question as a means of summarizing
their argument.8 3 In addition, it often requires experts to give categorical
79. Hand, supra note 5, at 54.
80. In German criminal cases, for example, the court first determines the facts it believes
to be true and then orders the expert witness to base his or her opinion on these facts. Kunert,
supra note 28, at 152.
81. Similarly, it has been suggested that such a procedure would conflict with the require-
ment that only "ultimate facts," and not "evidentiary facts," can be submitted to the jury for a
special verdict. Id. The procedure of the special verdict, which was not available under the
common law, has been permitted in United States federal courts since 1937, pursuant to FED.
R. Civ. P. 49. 5A J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 49.5 (1986).
82. Some courts have applied this requirement even when the expert testifies from per-
sonal knowledge. WEINSTEIN, supra note 70 at 705-4.
83. Advisory Committee's Note on FED. R. EvID. 705. As Wigmore observed: "It is a
strange irony that the hypothetical question, which is one of the few truly scientific features of
the rules of Evidence, should have become that feature which does most to disgust men of
science with the law of Evidence." 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 6.86, at 812 (3d ed. 1940).
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answers to artificially framed questions without being able to explain or
qualify their opinions.84 This distorts the experts' testimony and is one
of the main sources of experts' frustrations with the common-law adver-
sary system.
5
As a result of the problems that the hypothetical question creates,
the United States Federal Rules of Evidence, enacted in 1975, eliminate
the requirement that experts disclose the factual foundation of their opin-
ions. 6 The drafters of the Federal Rules felt that, given the extensive
pretrial discovery now permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure with respect to an adverse party's expert information, the expert
witness' factual assumptions may be sufficiently tested on cross- examina-
tion.8 7 Many states, however, still require that experts disclose the fac-
tual foundation of their opinions."8 In England, where such pretrial
discovery does not exist, the hypothetical question is still viewed as a
necessary evil.8 9
In addition to the hypothetical question requirement, courts require
experts to base their conclusions only on admissible evidence.9" Under
this rule the expert's testimony may not be based on hearsay or another
person's opinion, but only on personal first-hand observation. 91 For ex-
ample, expert physicians may not base their conclusions upon the com-
munications of other medical personnel regarding a patient's condition,
and expert scientists may not base their opinions on their colleagues'
reports.
The rationale for the rule is that an expert opinion based on hearsay
or another person's opinion may be unreliable and cannot be effectively
tested by cross-examination.92 The rule, however, is wholly incompatible
84. Id.
85. For a discussion of the frustration of many experts with the hypothetical question
requirement as well as other aspects of Anglo-American adjudication, see Friedman, The Sci-
entist as Expert Witness: Why Lawyers and Scientists Can't Talk to Each Other, 18
JURIMETRICS J. 99 (1977).
86. The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons there-
for without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires
otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts
or data on cross-examination.
FED. R. EVID. 705.
87. See generally WEINSTEIN, supra note 84, at 705-12 to - 21.
88. FED. R. EVID. 705, Advisory Committee's Note.
89. R. CROSS, supra note 65, at 441.
90. Id.
91. State v. David, 222 N.C. 242, 254-55, 22 S.E.2d 632, 640- 41 (1942); Taylor v. B.
Heller & Co., 364 F.2d 608, 613 (6th Cir. 1966).
92. Assoc. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL
COURTS, REPORT WITH RESPECT TO THE PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED
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with the practice of most modem technical disciplines, in which experts
rely heavily on reports, opinions, and communications of others. Ac-
cordingly, the Federal Rules as well as some pre-1975 case law93 explic-
itly permit experts to base their testimony on facts that would not
otherwise be admissible in evidence so long as the facts are of a type
"reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field."9 4
In England the rule also has been liberalized to account for the reali-
ties of expert practice. In a recent criminal case regarding the issue of
expert evidence based upon hearsay, Regina v. Abadom,95 the Home Of-
fice expert personally analyzed fragments of glass and then compared his
analysis with statistics that the Home Office Central Research Establish-
ment had compiled to determine the type and probable origin of the
glass. The Court of Appeal rejected a claim that the expert had based his
opinion upon inadmissible hearsay. The Court held that experts may
rely on the work of others to arrive at their own conclusions so long as
they make reference to such work in their testimony and a court deter-
mines that such work is reliable. At the same time, however, the facts
that are basic to the question on which experts are asked to express their
opinions must be proved by admissible evidence. Moreover, in civil pro-
ceedings even the facts that are basic to the expert's testimony no longer
need to be based upon personal analysis so long as they are found in a
contemporaneously kept "record" or are related to the expert by a third
party who has personally observed them. Such hearsay is now admissi-
ble evidence in civil proceedings pursuant to the Civil Evidence Act of
1968.96
The common law further requires that expert testimony, like lay tes-
timony, be made orally before the court. The requirement of oral testi-
STATES DIsTRICr COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 68 (May 28, 1970), cited in WEINSTEIN, supra
note 70, at 703-9.
93. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 70, at 703-10. English case law also has made numerous
exceptions to the rule. See R. CROSS, supra note 65, at 441.
94. FED. R. EVID. 703. Rule 703 has been criticized on the grounds that there is too
much difficulty in drawing the line between data that can and cannot be reasonably relied
upon. PROJECT OF A COMMITTEE OF NEw YORK TRIAL LAWYERS, RECOMMENDATION AND
STUDY RELATING TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE'S PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE PRO-
POSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 204 (June 1, 1970), cited in WEINSTEIN, supra note 70,
at 703-5. At the very least, the rule increases the dependency of the judge on the expert. As
noted by one commentator: "Since the expert, not the judge, will know what is reasonably
relied upon in his field, the court will usually follow the expert's advice on the point." WEIN-
STEIN, supra note 70, at 703-5.
95. [1983] 1 W.L.R. 126.
96. In Abadom the court found that this requirement was satisfied because the expert had
personally analyzed the glass in question and had only relied upon the work of others in arriv-
ing at his conclusion. Id.
1986]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
mony at trial is in keeping with the concentrated, public nature of
common-law adjudication and the fundamental common-law belief that
witness testimony can be properly assessed only if the adverse party is
given a chance to cross-examine the witness and the jury has the oppor-
tunity to observe the witness' demeanor.97 Accordingly, written expert
reports, textbooks, and learned treatises traditionally have been regarded
as inadmissible hearsay.98 Strictly speaking, since written materials con-
tain out-of-court statements, they are inadmissible as evidence even if the
author is present as a witness. The author, however, may introduce the
statements as testimony by repeating them orally on the stand.99
While the requirement that experts testify orally is consistent with
the traditional principles of common-law adjudication, it is not necessar-
ily conducive to the determination of complex technical issues. There is
little value in having the trier of fact observe the demeanor of the expert
when the matter in dispute is the expert's judgment and not his or her
veracity. In addition, cross-examination regarding the intricacies of such
technical issues may confuse rather than enlighten the trier of fact. This
may draw the trier of fact into a technical polemic which only persons
well trained in the particular area of expertise could hope to understand.
The presentation of a written report, on the other hand, would en-
able the trier of fact to study carefully the expert's position and the data
on which it is based before the expert is called upon to explain or defend
it.1" Moreover, the use of treatises is generally cheaper, less time con-
97. R. CROSS, supra note 65, at 451. Under the Act, "first hand" hearsay is an out of
court statement that is introduced in court by (1) direct oral testimony of the maker of the
statemtent, (2) production of a document authored by the maker in which the statement is
made, or (3) the direct oral testimony of a witness who heard the statement being made. Such
hearsay is admissible (1) with the leave of the court when the maker is called as a witness, (2)
as of right when notice of intention to tender it in evidence has been served on the opposing
party and either the maker need not be called as a witness for one of the reasons set forth in § 8
of the Act or the opposing party does not serve a counter-notice demanding that the maker be
called, and in either situation the maker is not in fact called, or (3) at the discretion of the
court. Second hand hearsay, which is a statement that B told A, who then relayed it to the
witness, is generally not admissible. A significant exception to this rule is statements compiled
in a record by someone acting under a duty to keep it and which were supplied by someone
with personal knowledge of the facts, either directly (in which case the statement is actually
first hand hearsay) or through an intermediary. R. CROSS, supra note 65, at 482-83, 494.
98. Wigmore labelled cross-examination as "beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine
ever invented for the discovery of truth." 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367, at 32 (Chad-
bourne rev. ed. 1974).
99. Korn, Law, Fact, and Science in the Courts, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1080, 1087 (1966);
Dolcin Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission, 219 F.2d 742, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 981 (1955) ("When used to prove the truth of their contents scientific writings are
clearly hearsay and are rejected as judicial evidence in all but a few jurisdictions.").
100. Such works may also be put to the expert on cross- examination (although in some
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suming, and less demanding of the expert's time than is calling the expert
to testify in person.101
Modem reforms have in some measure liberalized the rule against
written expert testimony. The Federal Rules make an exception to the
hearsay rule for statements contained in published works "on a subject of
history, medicine, or other science or art" that are "called to the atten-
tion of an expert witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by him
in direct examination . . . [and] established as a reliable authority by
testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by
judicial notice."' 10 2 Interestingly, these statements must be-re-aff--rally
into evidence and not submitted in written form, 103 ostensibly to avoid
giving them greater weight than they may deserve.
Similarly, in England written passages to which expert witnesses re-
fer are now admissible evidence so long as those qualified in the applica-
ble specialty deem them to be sufficiently authoritative."° In addition,
England's Supreme Court Rules were amended in 1974 to go considera-
bly further than the United States Federal Rules in admitting written
expert testimony. They permit the court to allow the introduction of
statements written by an expert who "cannot or should not be called as a
witness."105 Under this provision the court could presumably permit the
introduction of learned treatises and expert reports, even when not spe-
cifically referred to by an expert witness, so long as the written state-
ment's reliabilty has been established. In addition, as discussed herein,10 6
the Supreme Court Rules now provide for the introduction into evidence
of the written reports of experts who are called as witnesses under certain
circumstances.
Finally, the expert, like the lay witness, traditionally has been pre-
cluded from testifying about "ultimate issues" in dispute. The rationale
American jurisdictions the expert must first acknowledge the treatise as a standard work in the
field) and the judge may form an opinion on the basis of other parts of the work, even though it
is not considered to be evidence. Korn, supra note 99, at 1087; R. CROSS, supra note 65, at
441.
101. See Kom, supra note 99, at 1086-87.
102. WEINSTEIN, supra note 70, at 803-326.
103. FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
104. Id. This requirement was added to the original draft of rule 803(18) at the suggestion
of a committee of New York Trial Lawyers. WEINSTEIN, supra note 70, at 803-70.
105. H. v. Schering Chemicals, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 143, 148; Regina v. Abadom, [1983] 1
W.L.R. 126, 131; LAw REFORM COMMITrEE, supra note 72, at 11.
106. LORD CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE, RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT [R.S.C.] 0.38, r.41,
at 112G (1965), reprinted in I THE SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 600 (7th ed. 1985)[hereinafter
reference will be made to by order number, rule number, and the corresponding page in
R.S.C.].
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for this rule is to prevent witnesses from playing any role in the determi-
nation of facts, which is deemed to be the sole province of the jury. For
example, the United States Supreme Court ruled in 1935 that an expert
medical opinion that an insured had become "totally and permanently
disabled" could not be given because this was "the ultimate issue to be
decided by the jury upon all the evidence in obedience to the judge's
instructions as to the meaning of the crucial phrase, and other questions
of law." 10 7 "The experts," the Court stated, "ought not to have been
asked or allowed to state their conclusions on the whole case."'1
0 8
This ultimate issue rule is largely unworkable. The distinction be-
tween ultimate and non-ultimate facts is exceedingly difficult to draw,
and witnesses often cannot express their testimony in anything but ulti-
mate facts.109 In addition, commentators have questioned whether the
expert really can "invade the province of the jury" since the jury is al-
ways free to reject the expert's opinion.110 As a result, courts in England
and the United States began to honor the rule more in its breach than in
its observance."1  Finally, the Civil Evidence Act of 1972112 in England
and the Federal Rules of Evidence' 13 in the United States both purported
to abolish the rule.
Even after these enactments, however, there continues to be concern
that experts could unduly influence the jury and, in effect, usurp the
jury's role in fact determination. 1 14 Thus, there remain certain areas in
which expert testimony is not allowed. First, experts are generally re-
stricted from opining about the credibility of witnesses. For example, the
Tenth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals refused to allow
expert testimony on the general weakness of eyewitness testimony.
115
Similarly, the English Court of Appeal, in refusing to permit a psychia-
trist to testify as to the veracity of a witness, reasoned:
If any such rule [permitting this testimony] was applied in our
courts, trial by psychiatrists would be likely to take the place of trial by
107. See infra notes 130-135 and accompanying text.
108. United States v. Spaulding, 293 U.S. 498, 506 (1935).
109. Id.
110. WEINSTEIN, supra note 70, at 704-6.
111. Id.
112. R. CRoSS, supra note 5, at 446; FED. R. EVID. 704, Advisory Committee's Note.
113. Section 3(1) of the Act provides that "where a person is called as a witness in any civil
proceedings, his opinion on any relevant matter on which he is qualified to give expert evidence
shall be admissible in evidence."
114. As originally enacted in 1975, rule 704 provided: "Testimony in the form of an opin-
ion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue
to be decided by the trier of fact." FED. R. EvID. 704.
115. See infra text accompanying notes 116-125.
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jury and magistrates .... [W]e are firmly of the opinion that psychiatry
has not yet become a satisfactory substitute for the common sense of
juries or magistrates on matters within their experience of life.
1 16
Second, courts have precluded experts from couching their opinions
in terms of legal standards. The primary concern is that the jury may
confuse the expert's definition with the legal definition and turn to the
expert, rather than the judge, for guidance on the applicable law.117
Thus, a statement by a physician that a person is disabled within the
special meaning of a term in an insurance policy or statute may not be
permitted. 18 In addition, courts have disallowed expert testimony inter-
preting the meaning of regulations'1 9 and a court order.12 0 Courts have
also precluded testimony whether a criminal defendant had the requisite
mental state for the commission of a particular crime.' This position
was codified in a 1984 amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
122
Finally, experts may not tell the jury what result to reach. For ex-
ample, it has been held that it is improper for a witness to express an
opinion on the issue of a defendant's guilt or innocence.123 Similarly, the
Federal Rules Advisory Committee noted that in a probate matter the
question, "Did the testator have capacity to make a will?" would be
excluded.' 24
As we have seen, modern reforms regarding the testimony of the
expert witness have only partially alleviated the problems inherent in the
treatment of the expert as a partisan witness. It is widely perceived that
the dictates of common-law adjudication, with its emphasis on adver-
sarial oral proceedings and fact determination by laypersons or non-
specialist judges, are simply incompatible with the realities of technical
expertise and opinion. The dissatisfaction with treatment of the expert
has prompted many proposals that would alter the role of the expert in
116. United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048, 1054 (10th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S.
1100 (1977).
117. R. v. Turner, [1975] Q.B. 834, 842-43.
118. WEINSTEIN, supra note 70, at 704-14 to -15; but see, People v. Martinez, 43 Colo.
App. 419, 421, 608 P.2d 359, 360-61 (1979) (permissible for physician to testify that assault
victim's injuries amounted to "serious bodily injury" in the language of the statutes defining
crime of assault).
119. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 70, at 704-14 to -15.
120. F.A.A. v. Landy, 705 F.2d 624, 632 (2d Cir. 1983).
121. United States v. Zipkin, 729 F.2d 384, 386-87 (6th Cir. 1984).
122. State v. Flick, 425 A.2d 167, 170-71 (Me. 1981).
123. FED. R. EvID. 704.
124. Patterson v. State, 267 Ark. 436, 446, 591 S.W.2d 356, 362 (Ark. 1979), cert. denied,
447 U.S. 923 (1980).
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common-law adjudication rather than merely remove some of the tradi-
tional constraints on expert testimony.
The English Parliament's response to the problem of the expert wit-
ness is termed by the English White Book'25 as "a radical departure in
the law and practice relating to adducing expert evidence at the trial of
civil proceedings."' 26 The proposal was put forth in the Seventeenth Re-
port of the Law Reform Committee in 1970,127 enacted in the Civil Evi-
dence Act of 1972,128 and promulgated in the Supreme Court Rules of
1974.129 It restricts the previously unlimited right of a party to call ex-
pert evidence. The rules provide that the court may require a party to
disclose expert evidence to his or her opponent as a condition to using it
at trial. The rules distinguish between two classes of expert evidence:
expert evidence in personal injury actions, for which the court must di-
rect disclosure to other parties unless it determines that a sufficient rea-
son exists for not doing so, 130 and expert evidence in other actions, for
which the court may direct disclosure only if satisfied that it is desirable
to do SO.'
3 '
A party to whom an expert's report has been disclosed under the
rules may introduce the report into evidence.' 32 In addition, when the
expert is called as a witness, the party that has called the witness may put
the written report into evidence. 133 Finally, as discussed above, the court
may also admit the written statement of an expert who "cannot or should
not be called as a witness."'
134
Despite its appellation as a "radical departure" from existing prac-
tice, the English reform leaves essentially unchanged the traditional com-
mon-law method by which the court is informed of matters requiring
special knowledge or expertise. The Law Reform Committee specifically
considered and rejected more fundamental changes. Instead the Com-
mittee stated: "We think that it should continue to be left to the parties
125. FED. R. EVID. 704, Advisory Committee's Notes.
126. The "White Book" is the name commonly used to describe "The Supreme Court
Practice," the seminal, annotated compilation of the rules of procedure and evidence for Great
Britain's trial courts. See supra note 106.
127. 1 THE SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 106, at 595.
128. LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, supra note 72, at 36-38.
129. Civil Evidence Act of 1972, ch. 30, § 2(3).
130. R.S.C. 0.38, rr.35-44, supra, note 106, at 112F-112H.
131. R.S.C. 0.38, r.37, supra note 106, at 112F-112G.
132. R.S.C. 0.38, r.38, supra note 106, at 112G.
133. R.S.C. 0.38, r.42, supra note 106, at 112H.
134. R.S.C. 0.38, r.43, supra note 106, at 112H. A party may also put into evidence an
expert report disclosed to him or her by another party pursuant to the requirements of order
38. R.S.C. 0.38, r.42, supra note 106, at 112H.
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to choose and call their own expert witnesses, whose evidence should...
be subject to the ordinary process of oral examination, cross-examination
and re-examination, which is a basic principle of the adversary sys-
tem."' 35 Even the requirement that the parties exchange written reports,
which is the essence of the English reform, is substantially limited by the
court's right to waive the requirement in two cases. First, in personal
injury actions whenever, inter alia, medical experts might opine regard-
ing the manner in which the injuries were sustained or the genuineness of
the complained of symptoms.136 Second, in the case of other expert evi-
dence whenever, inter alia, the expert evidence will be based on facts in
dispute or facts that are not ascertainable by the experts' own observa-
tions or within their general professional knowledge and experience. 137
A somewhat more far reaching proposal would provide for the ap-
pointment of expert witnesses by the court rather than, or in addition to,
their appointment by the parties. 138 Anglo-American courts have an in-
herent "power to call and examine witnesses to elicit the truth," 1
39
although in England the power has been expressly limited to criminal
cases."4 The power, which includes the right to appoint expert wit-
nesses,1 41 has not been asserted frequently in either country, however,
because it is often seen to conflict with the principles of an adversary
system of justice.142
The United States codified the power of the court to appoint expert
witnesses in 1946 in rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
and in 1975 in rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Thus, a court
may make such an appointment on its own motion or the motion of a
party. 1 43 The appointment of an expert under the rules is designed to
maintain the expert in the role of a witness, albeit not a partisan witness,
135. R.S.C. 0.38, r.41, supra note 106, at 112G.
136. LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, supra note 72, at 11.
137. R.S.C. 0.38, r.37, supra note 106, at 112G.
138. R.S.C. 0.38, r.37, supra note 106, at 112F-112G.
139. As discussed below in the text accompanying notes 144-148, infra, this proposal was
adopted in FED. R. EVID. 706.
140. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 54 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See
generally Note, The Trial Judge's Use of His Power to Call Witnesses--An Aid to Adversary
Presentation, 51 N. W. L. REv. 761 (1957).
141. R. v. Dora Harris, [1927] 2 K.B. 587; In re Enoch and Zeretzky, Bock & Co's. [1910]
I K.B. 327.
142. FED. R. EVID. 706, Advisory Committee's Note, and cases cited therein.
143. Sink, supra note 68, at 212; WEINSTEIN, supra note 70, at 706-9. An exception is the
much-discussed New York City plan for impartial medical testimony in personal injury cases,
which was implemented in 1952. FED. R. EVID. 706, Advisory Committee's Note, and articles
cited therein. For a collection of cases in which court experts have been appointed, see Anno-
tation, 95 A.L.R.2D 390 (1964).
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and to preserve essential tenets of common-law adversary procedure.
The expert testifies orally in court and is subject to cross-examination by
each party. Moreover, the court may, in its discretion, disclose to the
jury the fact that the expert has been appointed by the court. 1" Finally,
the rules explicitly preserve the right of the parties to call expert wit-
nesses of their own selection.
The Federal Rules Advisory Committee noted that rule 706 would
probably not be invoked frequently and thus that its essential purpose
would be to dissuade litigants from misusing partisan expert procedure
for fear that judges might appoint their own experts.' 45 Consistent with
its limited purpose, the rule has produced few cases of judges actually
appointing an expert.1 46 As indicated by Judge Weinstein, federal trial
judges "remain committed to adversarial responsibility for presenting
evidence."1
47
In England, order 40 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, promul-
gated in 1936, empowers the judge to appoint an expert on the applica-
tion of a party in a nonjury trial. The order gives the parties the right to
cross-examine the court expert and to call one expert witness in rebuttal.
Order 40 applications are rare and are not the subject of any reported
decision.1 48 Moreover, the Parliament's Law Reform Committee recom-
mended in 1970 that court experts generally should not be appointed.149
The Committee reasoned that the appointment of a court expert should
not deprive the parties of their rights to cross-examine the court expert
and call their own experts. Given this basic proposition, the Committee
concluded that "the appointment of a court expert can only add to the
length and cost of the litigation." "5
144. The appointment either on the party's motion or the judge's own motion is provided
for explicitly by rule 706 and implicitly by rule 28. FED. R. EvID. 706, Advisory Committee's
Note; FED. R. CRIM. P. 28. Some states also provide for the appointment of impartial court
experts. Most of this state legislation is modeled on rule 706, although California has had a
comprehensive scheme for impartial experts since 1925. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1871, as
reenacted in CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 723, 730-733 (Deering 1986).
145. In contrast to the Federal Rules, the Model Code of Evidence and Uniform Expert
Testimony Act both require that the jury be informed of the expert's neutral status, thus giving
his testimony greater weight in the eyes of the jury. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 407
(1942); UNIF. EXPERT TESTIMONY ACT § 8
146. FED. R. EVID. 706, Advisory Committee's Note.
147. WEINSTEIN, supra note 70, at 706-11; but see, Students of California School for the
Blind v. Honig, 736 F.2d 538 (9th Cir. 1984), in which the trial judge reopened the case and
appointed a neutral expert after being unable to decide the merits of the plaintiff's claims on
the basis of the evidence presented at trial.
148. WEINSTEIN, supra note 70, at 706-12.
149. Basten, supra note 67, at 176.
150. LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, supra note 72, at 8-9, 31.
[Vol. 10
Expert Opinion and Reform
It also has been suggested that rather than merely serving as wit-
nesses, experts should enjoy an active role in fact determination. This
might be accomplished by the appointment of experts as assessors and
masters. Whereas a witness testifies in court and is subject to cross-ex-
amination, an assessor advises the judge in chambers.1"1 In England, or-
der 33, rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules provides that a judge may sit
with expert assessors. In practice, however, this procedure is rarely em-
ployed except in admiralty cases.1 52 The Law Reform Committee rec-
ommended that this procedure should be confined to admiralty cases and
not adopted in general practice. 53 The Committee reasoned that if the
judge's fact determination responsibilities were delegated to the assessor
and if the assessor's opinion was not subject to cross-examination, then
"[t]o litigants and their lawyers accustomed to the adversary system, jus-
tice would not... be seen to be done."
15 4
Unlike witnesses and assessors who are themselves sources of infor-
mation, masters hold hearings and make findings on the basis of the evi-
dence they collect. Rule 53 of the United States Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provides for reference to a special master in jury and nonjury
actions. In jury actions the master's findings may be read to the jury as
evidence. 5 In nonjury cases the court must accept the findings unless
they are clearly erroneous.1
5 6
A committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States recom-
mended in 1951 that courts employ experts as special masters to aid in
the determination of disputed scientific or technical facts of unusual com-
plexity. 57 The Committee stated that experts have advantages over
generalist judges and laypersons in that they:
(1) [can] understand better than non-experts the terminology
used by expert witnesses in discussing the subject, (2) can more accu-
rately evaluate differences in the qualifications of expert witnesses, in
the material used by such witnesses, and in the processes by which
such witnesses fashion conclusions from the material used, and (3) can
more accurately formulate and express basic findings and conclusions
upon such issues.1
5 8
151. Id. at 9.
152. Basten, supra note 67, at 189.
153. LAW REFORM COMMITTEE, supra note 72, at 6.
154. Id. at 7, 31.
155. Id. at 7.
156. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(3).
157. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2).
158. PRETTYMAN, REPORT ON PROCEDURE IN ANTITRUST AND OTHER PROTRACTED
CASES, reprinted in Yankowich, "Short Cuts" in Long Cases, 13 F.R.D. 41, 62, 80 (1951).
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Despite this recommendation, appointments of experts as special
masters remain rare. 59 Much of the reluctance to employ experts in this
manner derives from the requirement in rule 53 that "[a] reference to a
master shall be the exception and not the rule."' 60 The requirement is
adhered to strictly because, as one federal judge noted, "a proceeding
where the issue of [witness] credibility is to some degree determined
outside the courtroom is alien to our judicial philosophy."'' Moreover,
even when a court refers to a special master, the formal responsibility for
fact determination is left with the judge or the jury. In nonjury trials the
judge must determine whether the master's findings are clearly errone-
ous. In jury trials the jury must evaluate the findings along with the
other evidence.
Along lines similar to the proposals regarding assessors and special
masters is the proposal for the use of advisory juries composed of experts
from the appropriate field, much like the expert juries of fifteenth century
England. The advisory jury, the revival of which Learned Hand pro-
posed as early as 1901,162 would aid the judge or jury in understanding
complicated evidence. Rule 39(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provides for the use of an advisory jury in nonjury trials. 63 There
are, however, no reported cases of rule 39(c) ever having been used to
empanel a jury of experts. Moreover, the cases indicate that the use of
advisory juries is inadvisable when the issues are complex and compli-
cated, thus suggesting that the appointment of an advisory jury of ex-
perts is not contemplated by rule 39(c). 111
Finally, commentators have suggested that judges and their staffs
should, through training or selective appointment, become experts in var-
ious fields.' 6 5 Such proposals include: establishing a system of special
courts run by expert judges equipped to deal with technical matters, set-
ting up a cadre of scientific experts to assist judges in understanding tech-
nical data, and introducing into law school curricula courses in
understanding science and technology.' 66 While the use of experts as
159. Id.
160. See generally, Kaufman, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 COLUM. L. REv.
452, 460-62 (1958).
161. Kaufman, supra note 160, at 461.
162. Hand, supra note 5, at 56.
163. FED. R. Civ. P. 39(c).
164. The rule permits the judge to empanel an advisory jury in cases in which the parties
have no right to a jury trial or have waived that right. The judge is not bound by the decision
of such a jury. See 5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 39-33 to -39 (2d ed. 1986).
165. Ford v. C. E. Wilson Co., Inc., 30 F. Supp. 163, 166 (D. Conn. 1939); Fleming v.
Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. Inc., 38 F. Supp. 1001, 1003 (W.D. La. 1941).
166. See Markey, supra note 13, at 534. The idea that judges should have some technical
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judges is one of the attractions of commercial and industrial arbitra-
tion, 167 judges in formal Anglo-American court systems have not been
required to improve their scientific competence, and specialized courts
that handle technical matters have not been created. Moreover, the pro-
posal for adjudication by technical experts has been criticized as running
directly contrary to the fundamental common-law principle of adjudica-
tion by a nonspecialist trier of fact who has no preconceptions regarding
the issues at hand.
1 61
B. The Expert in Civil-Law Adjudication
The essential role of the expert in the civil law is an impartial, court-
appointed consultant rather than a partisan witness. 169 The use of im-
partial experts in the civil-law tradition dates back to the Roman era,
when surveyors were consulted in boundary disputes. 170  King Louis
XIV of France established the framework for the modem expert proce-
dure in the Ordinance of 1667, and the Napoleonic Code of Civil Proce-
dure incorporated the procedure in 1806.171 The expertise procedure was
substantially revised in 1944172 and further amended in 1973.171
In civil-law adjudication, experts are appointed by the court either
on its own motion or the motion of a party. 74 Experts are impartial
officers of the court who conduct their investigation in accordance with
the court's directions. 175 While courts may ask experts to give an oral
expertise is hardly novel. In Jewish law, the judges of the Sanhedrin were required to possess
knowledge of the general sciences. CODE OF MAIMONIDES, Judges, 14:7 (A. Hershman trans.
1949).
167. See Jasanoff & Nelkin, Science, Technology, and the Limits of Judicial Competence,
214 Sci. 1211, 1214 (1981); Markey, supra note 13, at 534-35, 538.
168. Basten, supra note 64, at 190.
169. Markey, supra note 13, at 534; Rifkind, Special Courtfor Patent Litigation? The Dan-
ger of a Specialized Judiciary, 37 A.B.A. J. 425, 426 (1951).
170. The procedure regarding the expert is governed in France by the new NOUVEAU
CODE DE PROCtDURE CIVILE [C. PR. Civ.] arts. 232-284 (1973) (civil procedure) and CODE
DE PROCtDURE PIANALE [C. PR. PEN.] arts. 156-169 (criminal procedure), in Germany by
[ZPO] §§ 402-414 (civil procedure), and in Italy by CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE [C.P.C.]
arts. 191-201 and CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE [C.P.P.] arts. 314-325.
171. Travis, supra note 19, at 493 & n.14.
172. Id. at 493.
173. Law of July 15, 1944, concerning Experts, (1944) J.O. 1903, (1944) D.A.L. 82, cited in
Travis, supra note 19, at 493- 94.
174. D6cret du 17 Dec. 1973.
175. Travis, supra note 19, at 514 (France); G. CERTOMA, supra note 30, at 200 (Italy);
Cohn, supra note 29, at 225 (Germany). A recent French case holds that the court may refuse
to appoint an expert when the party's sole motive for requesting the appointment is to obtain
its competitor's manufacturing secrets. Judgment of Mar. 14, 1984, Cass. civ. 2e, Fr., 1984 La
Semaine Juridique [J.C.P.] IV No. 58, at 161. In criminal cases in Italy, the judge must
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report to the court regarding matters already within their knowledge,176
the expert's function is usually more akin to that of the special master in
common-law adjudication. The expert conducts investigations and takes
evidence from the parties and third persons, including other experts,
177
and usually presents a written report containing observations and opin-
ions. 171 In civil cases in France and Italy, the court may request that
experts appear in court to explain their written report. 179 This is rarely
done, however, and in any event, no cross-examination is allowed.180 In
Germany and in criminal cases in France, a party may require that the
expert appear and limited cross-examination is permitted.181 The parties
may submit reports of their own experts, 182 but these do not constitute
evidence and are generally given little weight.
The civil-law procedure for expert opinion avoids many of the pit-
falls of the common-law approach. The problems in common-law adju-
dication that arise from the manner in which the expert testifies are
obviated by the civil law's essentially written procedure and lack of re-
strictive evidentiary rules. Making the expert an impartial officer of the
court rather than a partisan witness avoids the Anglo-American "battle
of the experts." As a result of its avoidance of these problems, the civil-
law approach has been seen as a possible model for reform in common-
appoint an expert when so required to investigate a technical issue beyond the understanding
of the judge. C.P.P. art. 314. Likewise, in Germany the failure of the trial court to appoint an
expert witness on its own motion in order to clarify evidence that may exonerate the criminal
defendant is a frequent ground for reversal. Kunert, supra note 28, at 161-62.
176. P. HERZOG, supra note 27, at 350; C. PR. ciV. art. 265 (France); G. CERTOMA, supra
note 30, at 200 (Italy); Cohn, supra note 29, at 225 (Germany).
177. French law provides a procedure by which a judge may consult with an expert for
purely technical questions that do not require complex investigations. C. PR. CIV. arts. 256-
262. Likewise, in criminal cases in Italy, experts may be appointed during the trial phase of the
proceeding to report orally regarding matters already within their knowledge. If they must
conduct an investigation, however, they file written reports. G. CERTOMA, supra note 30, at
237.
178. C. PR. CIV. arts. 273-278 (France); G. CERTOMA, supra note 30, at 200 (Italy); Cohn,
supra note 29, at 225 (Germany). Since the expert is not bound by formal rules of evidence to
the extent they exist under the civil law, he or she may "interview witnesses informally, Le.,
not under oath, and may rely on such testimony in his... report." Travis, supra note 19, at
516 n.183.
179. Although experts generally give written reports, they may, upon occasion, be asked by
the court to report orally. Travis, supra note 19, at 504 (France); G. CERTOMA, supra note 30,
at 200 (Italy); Cohn, supra note 29, at 225 (Germany).
180. Travis, supra note 19, at 504 (France); G. CERTOMA, supra note 30, at 200, 237
(Italy).
181. Travis, supra note 19.
182. Kaplan, supra note 33, at 1243; Cohn, supra note 29, at 225; Ploscowe, The Expert
Witness in Criminal Cases in France, Germany, and Italy, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 504,
507 (1935).
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law adjudication.' 83
Nevertheless, as in the common law, the role of the expert has been
a source of considerable controversy in civil-law adjudication. Issues
surrounding the role of the expert are one of the most frequent sources of
judicial error and trial court reversal in civil-law litigation.'84
For example, Continental jurists were preoccupied for a good many
years with whether the court-appointed expert should be treated as a wit-
ness, judicial consultant, or judge.8 5 The traditional view in France was
that experts were witnesses, even though they were impartial. 8 6 Accord-
ingly, French law provided that the parties select the expert and that the
expert could be recused on the same grounds as could an ordinary wit-
ness.'8 7 Today, however, the expert is viewed essentially as a technical
advisor to the court. In order to dispel completely the notion that the
expert was an agent for the parties, French law was amended in 1944 to
vest the power of selection with the judge and to provide that an expert
could be recused on the same grounds as a judge.' s
As a practical matter, however, despite their appellation as a judicial
consultant, experts retain a significant relationship with the parties. Par-
ties in civil cases often use the expert procedure as a discovery device. 18 9
Since the law forbids counsel to interview prospective witnesses, 190 the
expert's informal examination of witnesses is the only way in which the
testimony of witnesses, let alone that of the adverse party, can be ob-
tained before the hearing.' 9 ' In addition, experts will sometimes give
technical advice to the parties. In a recent case, for example, a party
sued the court appointed expert for having incorrectly advised him on
how to repair a wall.' 92 Interestingly, the court held that although an
expert has no contractual relationship with the parties, the expert may be
183. Travis, supra note 19, at 511 (France); Kaplan, supra note 33, at 1243 (Germany); G.
CERTOMA, supra note 30, at 200, 237 (Italy).
184. See, e.g., Basten, supra note 67, at 174-75.
185. Ploscowe, supra note 182, at 508; Kunert, supra note 28, at 161-62.
186. Verin, L'expertise dans le procipdnal, 35 REVUE DU SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE
DROIT PANAL COMPARt 1022, 1029 (1980).
187. Hammelmann, Expert Evidence, 10 MOD. L. REV. 32, 37 (1947).
188. Id. at 37.
189. C. PR. CIV. arts. 232, 234; Hebraud, Commentaire, loi du 15juillet, 1944, 1945 D.L.
49, 55, cited in Travis, supra note 19, at 512 n.158.
190. This practice has been encouraged in France by a procedure by which an expertise
may be ordered even before a suit is initiated. P. HERZOG, supra note 27, at 349.
191. Id. at 232 (France); Cohn, supra note 29, at 175 (Germany).
192. P. HERZOG, supra note 27, at 234.
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liable in tort for negligently giving incorrect technical advice.19 3 (It
should be noted that French judges may also be liable to the parties for
gross negligence in carrying out their duties.)
194
On the other end of the spectrum is the recurrent problem of to
what extent the expert may assume judicial functions. Continental judges
have been criticized frequently for using the expertise procedure as a
means to delegate their judicial responsibilities. 95 A prime example of
such delegation is the case of Dame veuve Barthe, 196 in which the trial
court in Toulouse, France, appointed an attorney as an expert to assess
the value of furniture that had been sold by the defendant, report on the
defendant's motives for selling, hear the parties, and attempt to conciliate
them. While the Cour de cassation declared that this broad delegation
violates public policy, the delegation of judicial functions to experts re-
mains widespread.' 97
In an effort to curtail such delegations, the French Law of July 15,
1944, expressly limited the scope of the expertise to questions beyond the
technical competence of the court.198 French courts have side-stepped
the technical issue limitation, however, by finding that virtually anything
is "technical" within the meaning of the law, and have continued to per-
mit broad delegation as long as it is within the scope of the expert's mis-
sion as defined by the court.' 99 Thus, for example, the Cour de cassation
has upheld the appointment of an expert to determine the correct
amount of rent in a landlord-tenant dispute2"° and whether an employee
had actually done the work for which he sought overtime pay.20 '
Accordingly, the French Law of December 17, 1973,202 contains ad-
ditional amendments designed to curb delegation. The Law requires that
the judge set forth the circumstances which make the expertise neces-
193. Judgment of Mar. 31, 1984, Fr., Trib. gr. inst., Ire ch. civ., 1984 J.C.P. IV No. 58, at
329.
194. P. HERZOG, supra note 27, at 234.
195. Id. at 132-33.
196. See Travis, supra note 19, at 509-10; Kaplan, supra note 33, at 1243.
197. Judgment of Dec. 15, 1930, Fr., Civ. Toulouse, 1932 Receuil Dalloz P~riodique et
Critique [D.P.] I, at 114, discussed in Judgment of Apr. 1935, Fr., Cass. civ., 1935 D.P. I, at
94, note P. Mimin, and summarized in Travis, supra note 19, at 10.
198. See Travis, supra note 19, at 510; Kaplan, supra note 33, at 1243.
199. Loi de 15juillet, 1944, art. 306, 1944 J.O. 1903; 1944 D.A.L. 82, discussed in Travis,
supra note 19, at 509-10.
200. Travis, supra note 19, at 509-10.
201. Fr., Cass. soc., 1959 Bulletin des arrEts de la Cour de cassation [Bull. Civ.] IV No.
1099, cited in Travis, supra note 19, at 509 n.142.
202. Judgment of Apr. 29, 1970, Fr., Cass. soc., 1970 J.C.P. IV No. 44, at 159, cited in
Travis, supra note 19 at 509.
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sary,2 °3 and provides that the decision ordering the expertise may be ap-
pealed independently of the judgment on the merits. 2" In addition, the
Law provides that the expert may not give opinions of a juridical or-
der,2"' thus codifying a 1961 decision which annulled the appointment of
an expert physician to interpret clauses in a contract and determine
whether the clauses were in conformity with medical practice.20 6 The
1973 Law also explicitly provides that the judge may not give the expert
the mission of conciliating the parties, 207 although one commentator has
interpreted this to mean merely that the judge, and not the expert, must
give legal force to any settlement agreement entered into by the
parties.208
Another means of curbing delegation has been to attempt to involve
the judge in the expert's operations. Accordingly, the 1944 French Law
expressly gave the examining judge the option of attending the expert's
operations 20 9 and required experts to inform the judge in advance of their
progress.210 The 1973 Law further seeks to increase judicial involvement
in, and responsibility for, the expertise by providing that judges may re-
quire parties and experts to appear before them in order to specify the
details of the mission and the calendar for its operations.21' Previously,
it was primarily the expert's responsibility to explain to the parties the
extent of his or her duties.212
French commentators emphasize the need for more personal in-
volvement of the judge in the expertise and for better cooperation be-
203. For a comprehensive review of the changes regarding the expertise put into effect by
the Dicret no. 73-122 du 17 ddcembre 1973, see Olivier, Aspects nouveaux de l'expertise dans la
reforme de la procddure civile, 94 G.P. No. 4, Feb. 16, 1974, at 100 (Doctrine).
204. C. PR. CiV. art. 265; Olivier, supra note 203, at 101.
205. The appeal will lie only if authorized by the first president of the cour d'appel upon a
showing of a serious and legitimate reason. C. PR. CiV. art. 272; Olivier, supra note 203, at
101.
206. C. PR. CIV. art. 238.
207. Debeaurain, Les caracters de I'expertise civile, 1979 Recueil Dalloz Chronique 143, at
144. Likewise, in a 1980 case the Cour de cassation ruled that the appointment of an expert to
interpret a medical insurance agreement and government decree to determine whether the
insurer was liable under the agreement violated the article 232 proscription against appointing
an expert for a nontechnical matter. Judgment of Jan. 8, 1980, Cass. civ. Ire, Fr., 1980 J.C.P.
IV No. 54, at 110.
208. C. PR. CIV. art. 240.
209. Debeaurain, supra note 207, at 144.
210. Formerly C. PR. CiV. art. 315, subdivided, renumbered, and modified in 1973 as art.
274.
211. Formerly C. PR. CIV. art. 315, subdivided, renumbered, and modified in 1973 as art.
273.
212. C. PR. CIV. art. 266; Olivier, supra note 203, at 101.
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tween the judge and the expert.2 13 In this regard, commentators stress
that the judges must clearly and precisely set forth their instructions to
the expert and that the experts must limit their investigation to the scope
of those instructions.214
Another problem related to the delegation of judicial function is
how much weight the judge should give to an expert's opinion in reach-
ing a decision. In keeping with the civil-law principle of free evaluation
of the evidence,215 the judge may generally accept or reject the expert's
opinion as they deem appropriate. 216 For example, in a wel-known Ger-
man case, a woman claimed to be Anastasia, the daughter of the late
Czar.21 7 The court appointed handwriting expert opined that the plain-
tiff's Cyrillic handwriting was identical to that of Anastasia. The trial
court rejected the expert's views on the ground that the expert was not
sufficiently familiar with Cyrillic script, although the expert had indi-
cated that such familiarity was not a prerequisite for comparing the
handwritings. Generally, however, courts on the Continent tend to ac-
cept the court expert's report and give little credence to the party expert's
opinion. 2 8 This judicial tendency to accept the results of the expert's
investigation has often been criticized. 2 9 Yet such deference to the ex-
pert's judgment is understandable because civil-law judges, like their
common-law counterparts, lack the necessary technical training to make
an independent evaluation.220
In recognition of the fact that the expert's report is usually conclu-
sive, the parties generally have been given the right to monitor the exper-
tise and to require that the expert consider their position. In Italy, for
instance, parties may nominate their own experts to assist the court ex-
pert and to present their own written reports.221 Courts in France have
213. See Travis, supra note 19, at 515.
214. See, e.g., Olivier, supra note 203, at 100, 104; Verin, supra note 186, at 1029-30.
215. Debeaurain, supra note 207, at 145-46; Verin, supra note 186, at 1028.
216. See Basten, supra note 67, at 182.
217. C. PR. civ art. 246 provides, for example, that the judge is not bound by the observa-
tions or conclusions of the expert. In this regard, a recent case holds that the judge may decide
on the basis of the evidence set forth in the expert's report, while rejecting the expert's conclu-
sions. Judgment of Dec. 14, 1983, Cass. civ. 2e, Fr., J.C.P. IV No. 58, at 63. The judge must,
however, accept the expert's report when the parties have stipulated in advance that they will
accept it. P. HERZOG, supra note 27, at 354.
218. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1970, 53 Bundesgerichtsofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 245, de-
scribed in Cohn, supra note 29, at 225.
219. Cohn, supra note 29, at 225; Plowscowe, supra note 182, at 508.
220. See P. HERZOG, supra note 27, at 355; Hammelmann, supra note 187, at 38-39.
221. A classic and tragic example of civil-law judges' propensity to accept expert evidence
which they do not understand is the Dreyfus case. In that case, it has been claimed, the judges
allowed themselves to be impressed by the scientific phraseology of experts who through vari-
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required that court experts give the parties advance notice of all expertise
activities, and, when practical, the parties have the right to attend and
monitor the proceedings.222 French law also requires experts to consider
the observations or claims of the parties and to annex any written obser-
vations or claims to their opinions if the parties so demand.223 French
commentators emphasize that the expertise is supposed to be an adver-
sarial, quasi-judicial proceeding in which parties have a right to express
themselves and the expert must consider their position.224 In this regard,
the Cour de cassation has annulled an expert report that did not precisely
record the parties' allegations or discuss their objections. 225 In another
case, it overturned a lower court award where one of the parties had not
been present at the expertise, even though the absent party had been able
to study the contents of the expert's report.226
With regard to the issue of party supervision over the expert, it has
been proposed in France that the court be required to appoint an expert
to represent the defendant in criminal cases.227 The defense expert would
accompany the official expert to ensure the accuracy of the official ex-
pert's work, and if the two came to different conclusions a third expert
would be appointed.228 The Italian Code of Criminal Procedure of 1914
provided for such a procedure.229 It was abolished in 1931, however, and
the defense expert was reduced to a mere "technical consultant," whose
conclusions are of no more importance than the arguments of defense
counsel. 23 0 The drafters of the 1931 Italian Code suspected that the de-
fendant's expert had an interest in deceiving the judge.231 Apparently,
French legislators suspected the same and, thus, the proposal to appoint
ous mathematical demonstrations sought to show that Captain Dreyfus was the author of a
certain document that had allegedly fallen into German hands. These mathematical demon-
strations were completely disproved afterwards. See Tribe, supra note 7, at 1332-34.
222. G. CERTOMA, supra note 30, at 200.
223. Travis, supra note 19, at 517. The parties have no right to attend when the private or
technical nature of the expert's work would make it inappropriate, such as where the expert
undertakes a psychiatric examination of a party. Id. and cases cited therein.
224. C. PR. ciV. art. 276.
225. See, e.g., Debeaurain, supra note 207, at 144-45; Rousse, Le respect du principe du
contradictoire dans le ddroulement des operations d'expertise, 98 G.P. No. 2, Dec. 14, 1978, at
627 (Doctrine).
226. Debeaurain, supra note 207, at 145. The court upheld a report that did not specifi-
cally mention the parties' allegations, but did implicitly respond to them. Judgment of May
25, 1976, Cass. civ. 3e, Fr., 1976 Bull. Civ. III No. 228, at 176.
227. Judgment of May 15, 1977, Cass. civ. 3e, Fr., 1977 Bull. Civ. II No. 386, at 295, cited
in Debeaurain, supra note 207, at 145.
228. See Ploscowe, supra note 182, at 508.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 509 n.l1.
231. Id.
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a defense expert was never adopted.232
The generally mediocre quality of the work of court-appointed ex-
perts has also been a source of concern to judges and commentators.233
The French Law of 1973 seeks to curb the problem of experts overdele-
gating their responsibilities,2 34 which is considered to be one of the rea-
sons for their poor performance.235 The Law of 1973 provides that
experts must personally carry out their missions236 and may seek the
opinion of other experts only in specialities distinct from their own.23 7
The Law also provides that an institute or organization may be ap-
pointed as an expert.23' The organization, however, must provide the
judge with the names of the persons who will actually carry out the
239mission.
III. ISRAEL'S HYBRID APPROACH TO
EXPERT OPINION
Israel's adjudicatory system is essentially based on the common-law
system. The Israeli judge is more or less a neutral umpire, the proceed-
ings are essentially oral and concentrated, and the introduction of evi-
dence is governed by much the same rules as in Anglo-American
adjudication.24 ° At the same time, certain elements that are central to
Anglo-American adjudication, such as lay determination of facts, are ab-
sent in Israeli adjudication.
Israel's treatment of expert opinion in the judicial process is also
modeled largely on the Anglo-American system. The parties may retain
experts as partisan witnesses, and expert testimony is subject to cross-
examination. Israeli judges, however, have explicitly lauded the Con-
tintental approach to expert opinion, 241 and Israel has adopted certain
procedures regarding experts that fall somewhere between common-law
232. Id.
233. France's criminal procedure code provides for the appointment of at least two experts,
unless exceptional circumstances justify the designation of a single expert, but neither expert is
deemed to represent the defendant. C. PR. PEN. art 159.
234. See Kaplan, supra note 33, at 1243 (German judges commonly complain about the
quality of assistance experts provide); Verin, supra note 186, at 1028 (insufficient number of
available specialists); Ploscowe, supra note 182, at 508 (noting problem of incompetent
experts).
235. C. PR. CIV. art. 233.
236. Olivier, supra note 203, at 100.
237. See supra note 235.
238. C. PR. CIV. art. 278.
239. C. PR. CIV. art. 233.
240. Id.
241. See generally E. HARNON, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1977).
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and civil-law procedures.242 Israel's hybrid procedures include the intro-
duction of written reports as evidence and the frequent appointment of
impartial experts by the court. The full potential effect of Israel's re-
forms regarding the treatment of experts, however, has been lessened by
pressure to maintain the status quo within the common-law context.
A. Written Expert Reports
Section 20 of the Evidence Ordinance (New Version), 5731- 1971,
provides: "The court may, unless it apprehends a miscarriage of justice,
admit as evidence, in writing, an opinion by an expert to a matter of
science, research, art or professional knowledge .... 24324 Further-
more, the Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended in 1979, require that a
party who wishes to prove or to present testimony on a matter of exper-
tise must fie a written expert opinion with the court unless the court
exempts the party from this requirement for special reasons.245
Section 20 initially was introduced into law by the Law to Amend
the Evidence Ordinance, 5714-1954.246 The principal backers of this law
were the Ministry of Health and physician groups whose members
wanted to avoid having to appear in court to give medical expert testi-
mony.247 In the discussions regarding the proposed law in the Knesset,
Israel's legislators recognized that the written submission of evidence was
more akin to Continental procedure than to the common-law procedure
in force in Israel.24 Accordingly, they supported the inclusion of some
provision requiring the author of the expert report to appear in court for
cross-examination.249 The Committee of the Constitution, Law and Jus-
tice, which sponsored the legislation, was divided, however, on whether
the opposing party should have the right to call the expert for cross-
examination or whether the decision to subpoena the expert should be
left with the court. The majority favored the former approach.250 The
242. Barvar v. Ports Authority, (1) 32 P.D. 416, 419 (1978).
243. Another example of the adoption of the Continental approach in Israeli procedure
was the amendment to the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1963 that provided that plaintiffs who
seek to have their claims heard in a summary procedure must attach some written evidence to
the complaint, rather than use a sworn declaration to support their claim. SUSSMAN, THE
LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (4th ed. 1973).
244. Authorized Israel Ministry of Justice translation.
245. Rules of Civil Procedure 127 (medical opinion), 129 (nonmedical opinion), and 137
(noncompliance with rules 127 or 129).
246. Sefer Hukim 152, 5714-1954, at 106.
247. 15 DIVREI KNESSET 577 (5714-1954).
248. 15 DIVREI KNESSET 578 (5714-1954).
249. Id.
250. 16 DIVREI KNESSET 1691 (5714-1954).
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law, as ultimately passed, provides that the court may sua sponte order
the expert to appear and be examined in court and that the court must
accede to the request of a party for such an order. 251 The court may,
however, impose the costs of the examination upon a party that makes a
frivolous or vexatious request.
252
As interpreted by the Israeli Supreme Court, the right to cross-ex-
amine an expert is absolute253 and cannot be satisfied by directing the
expert to answer written interrogatories rather than submit to oral exam-
ination.254 Israeli courts have, however, made two exceptions to the
otherwise absolute requirement that experts be cross-examined at a
party's request. First, cross-examination of an expert or any other wit-
ness will not be permitted if it is apparent to the court that the purpose of
the examination is to elicit testimony which is immaterial to the subject
matter of the litigation.2 5 This exception is intended to prevent the mis-
use of the judicial process. 256 Given the utmost importance of the right
of cross-examination, the exception is to be narrowly construed and
rarely invoked.257 Second, a party may explicitly or implicitly waive the
right to cross-examination .25  The Supreme Court found such a waiver
in a case in which the party asserted the right in an untimely manner and
failed to ensure that the witness would appear for examination.259 In
another case, the Court held that a party's failure to introduce testimony
of his own expert did not constitute an implied waiver of his right to
cross-examine his opponent's expert.260
The requirement that the court must accede to a party's request to
cross-examine orally the author of an expert opinion has largely under-
mined the purpose of the provision for written reports. In 1972 the Ber-
enzon Committee for the Simplification of Matters and Improvement of
Procedures in Tort Cases found that expert physicians complained bit-
terly about having to waste their time in court, often without even being
called to testify, and about being subjected to demeaning cross-examina-
tion.26' These were the very same complaints that had led to the enact-
251. Evidence Ordinance (New Version), 5731-1971, § 26(a).
252. Id. § 26(b).
253. Moskowitz v. Abarbanel, (IV) 38 P.D. 131, 134 (1984); Yuval Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Fomess, (IV) 35 P.D. 640, 642 (1981).
254. Yuval Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Fomess, (IV) 35 P.D. 640 (1981).





260. Tiko v. Amsalem, (II) 35 P.D. 209 (1980).
261. REPORT OF THE BERENZON COMMITTEE FOR THE SIMPLIFICATION OF MATTERS
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ment of the Law to Amend the Evidence Ordinance, 5714-1954.262 The
Berenzon Committee recommended that the parties' experts be required
to file written reports, which would be the primary evidence of the ex-
pert's opinion.261 The Committee did not, however, recommend any lim-
itation on the parties' right to call or cross-examine the experts as
witnesses.
B. Impartial Experts
Until 1963 Israeli courts had no power to appoint impartial experts
except by agreement of the parties. In 1963 the Rules of Civil Procedure
were amended to permit the court appointment of physicians to deter-
mine the extent of injury in tort cases.2 4 In 1979 the rules were further
amended to provide for the court appointment of experts regarding any
matter of science, research, art, or professional knowledge. 26 The court
may appoint an expert regarding any issue in dispute at any time during
the proceedings, so long as the court first gives the parties an opportu-
nity to state their views on the appointment.266
The purpose of the rule permitting court appointment is, as repeat-
edly stated by Israeli courts, to simplify procedure and to prevent the
waste of time and money that results from parties bringing their own
expert witnesses.267 Accordingly, the Israel Supreme Court has empha-
sized that court appointment is to be preferred. 268 Nevertheless, as an
accommodation to common-law principles, the parties generally may ex-
amine the court expert and call their own expert witnesses even though a
court expert has been appointed.269 The most troublesome areas of
Israel's impartial expert procedure have arisen from this attempted "co-
existence" of the procedure for an impartial court expert with the com-
mon-law principles of party control of evidence and right to cross-
examination.
AND IMPROVEMENT OF PROCEDURES IN TORT CASES 68-70 (1972) [hereinafter BERENZON
COMMITrEE].
262. Id. at 72.
263. Id.
264. E. HARNON, supra note 241, at 308.
265. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 125, 130, Kovetz HaTakanot 3953 (1979).
266. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 130.
267. Ramat-Siv Ltd. v. Darzi Akram, (II) 22 P.D. 164, 167 (1968); Elock v. Bilon, (II) 26
P.D. 169 (1972).
268. Barvar v. Ports Authority, (II) 32 P.D. 416, 419 (1978), Judge Etzioni.
269. See text accompanying notes 271-293 infra.
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1. The Right of Parties to Call Their Own Expert Witnesses
After the Appointment of the Court Expert
The Israeli Supreme Court has repeatedly criticized the procedure
of calling expert witnesses after an impartial expert has been appointed, a
practice that complicates rather than simplifies the bringing of expert
opinion before the court.270 The Court, however, has been inconsistent
with regard to the extent to which the appointment of the expert may
limit the right of the parties to call their own expert witnesses.
In 1971, in Shakir v. Aloni,27 1 Justice Chaim Cohen held that the
court appointment of a physician expert272 does not per se limit the right
of the parties to call expert witnesses. Justice Cohen further held, how-
ever, that the plaintiff may impliedly waive the right to call a physician
expert: (1) by requesting court appointment of an expert when the plain-
tiff has not attached an expert report to the complaint; (2) by refusing, in
contravention of the Rules of Civil Procedure, to be examined by the
defendant's physician when the plaintiff has attached an expert report to
the complaint; or (3) by agreeing to the appointment of a court expert
and, either implicitly or explicitly, to the waiver of the right to call one's
own expert witness. 273 Two years later, however, in Lemonze v. David,
274
Justice Berenzon stated:
In my opinion the moment a medical expert is appointed by the
court .... except for medical reports already filed with the court and
medical testimony already heard before the appointment, the report of
the medical expert becomes the sole medical evidence or medical testi-
mony in the normal meaning of the term "evidence." Any medical
opinions filed after the appointment of the medical expert are merely
material for the expert to study and consider in reaching his conclu-
sions, and do not fall within the realm of "evidence" in the sense that
one can call their authors as witnesses before the court in order to
examine them.
275
In a concurring opinion, to which Justice Berenzon indicated his
approval, Justice Landau called for an end to the compromise arrange-
ment in which the parties retain the right to call their own experts even
270. See, e.g., Lemonze v. David, (II) 27 P.D. 409 (1973); Barvar v. Ports Authority, (I) 32
P.D. 416 (1978).
271. (II) 25 P.D. 800 (1971).
272. As indicated in the text accompanying note 265 supra, it was not until 1979 that the
court could appoint experts other than physicians.
273. Shakir v. Aloni, 25 P.D., at 802-3.
274. (II) 27 P.D. 409 (1973).
275. Id. at 410-11 (Author's trans.).
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after the appointment of a court expert. Justice Landau also called for an
amendment to the Rules of Civil Procedure to provide that medical re-
ports submitted after an expert's appointment will not constitute evi-
dence, but only material for the expert to consider in preparing his or her
report.27 6 Considering Justice Berenzon's agreement with Justice Lan-
dau's call for a change in the existing arrangement, it is unclear whether
Justice Berenzon intended his statement to be merely a recommendation,
as indicated in a 1981 District Court opinion,2 77 or a statement of the
law, as apparently concluded by Professor Harnon.278
In 1978, in Barvar v. Ports Authority,2 79 Justice Etzioni indicated
clearly that "the court has authority to appoint a medical expert on his
own initiative or upon the motion of a party... but has no authority to
prevent the bringing of additional medical evidence."28 Justice Etzioni
noted that the Minister of Justice's advisory committee, on which he had
served as chairman, had also recommended amending the Rules of Civil
Procedure to eliminate, to the extent possible, the need for multiple med-
ical experts.281
The 1979 Amendments to the rules are not as extensive as the
Supreme Court recommended. The amendments merely provide that
when an expert is appointed upon the agreement of all of the parties,
additional expert witnesses may be called only if the court so authorizes
for reasons that must be recorded.282 The amended rules also provide,
along the lines of the ruling in Shakir, that the court need not receive
medical reports or testimony from a plaintiff who fails to attach a report
to the complaint, refuses to be examined by the defendant's physician or
the court expert, or fails to submit a medical report after the opposing
party has submitted one.283 The rules also provide that, absent special
reasons for doing so, the court shall not hear the testimony of a nonmedi-
cal expert unless the party wishing to bring the testimony has duly fied
a written expert opinion with the court.284
In 1983 a judicial committee for greater efficiency in civil proceed-
ings recommended that upon the court's appointment of an expert no
276. Id. at 415.
277. Benyamin v. Victor, P.M. 192, 197 (Beersheva 1981).
278. E. HARNON, supra note 241, at 310, which paraphrases the Berenzon opinion as the
state of the law.
279. Barver v. Ports Authority, (I) 32 P.D. 416 (1978) (Author's trans.).
280. Id. at 419.
281. Id.
282. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 130(b).
283. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 137 (a) and (b).
284. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 137 (c).
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further partisan expert testimony should be permitted.285 The committee
reasoned that it would be sufficient to accord the parties the right, upon
receiving court approval, to pose "clarifying questions" to the court ex-
pert.286 The committee's recommendation, which comports with the
Supreme Court's calls for reform, has not been adopted.
In sum, the general rule in Israel is that a party may call an expert
witness, even if the court has appointed an impartial expert. As outlined
above, however, the party's right may be waived either through agree-
ment or by the failure of a party to submit a written report or, when
applicable, to submit to a physical examination. In addition, the 1985
Amendment to the Compensation to Traffic Accident Victims Law,
5735-1975,87 and its regulations provide that a traffic victim who wishes
to bring a medical issue before the court must request that the court
appoint an impartial medical expert to present an opinion regarding the
issue .2 The court's appointment of the expert terminates the parties'
right to call their own expert witnesses in this area, unless authorized by
the court in light of special circumstances. 89
2. The Right of the Parties to Examine the Court Expert
As indicated above, Israel's impartial expert procedure has raised
the issue of the parties' right to examine the court expert. In a 1965
District Court case, Meir v. Handassa Yamit Ezrahit,z9° Judge Sha'al
held that the report of the court expert does not constitute evidence per
se, but is merely an aid to the court. Thus, the right of cross-examination
set forth in section 26(a) of the Evidence Ordinance does not apply. In
contrast, in a 1966 District Court case, Shlomo v. Paz Oil Co.,29 Judge
Shamir found that, given the references in the Rules of Civil Procedure
to the "testimony" of the medical expert, the expert's report does in fact
constitute evidence and the court expert is, therefore, subject to exami-
nation. In 1968, in Ramat-Siv v. Ekram,2 92 Justice Landau stated
parenthetically that he preferred the approach of Judge Shamir to that of
Judge Sha'al. Ten years later, in Barvar v. Ports Authority,2 93 Justice Et-
285. Report of the Subcommittee for Greater Efficiency in Civil Trial Proceedings of the
Standing Committee Concerning the Judicial System (unpublished manuscript 1983) at 3.
286. Id.
287. Section 6A.
288. Compensation to Traffic Accident Victims (Experts) Regulations, 5745-1985, § 2.
289. Id. § 6A(b)(1).
290. 47 P.M. 75 (Haifa 1965).
291. 50 P.M. 190 (Beersheva 1966).
292. (II) 22 P.D. 164, 167 (1968).
293. (I) 32 P.D. 416, 419 (1978).
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zioni set the matter to rest by stating explicity that the parties' right of
cross-examination applies with regard to a court-appointed expert no less
than when the expert is a partisan witness. Moreover, the Traffic Acci-
dent Victim's Compensation Law, 5735-1975, provides explicitly that the
parties shall have the right to examine a court expert appointed pursuant
to the law.294
In 1983 a judicial committee for greater efficiency in civil proceed-
ings recommended that the parties be permitted to cross-examine the
court-appointed expert only if the court finds specific reasons for permit-
ting it. 295 This recommendation, however, has not been adopted. The
Traffic Accident Victim's Compensation Law, 5735-1975, provides that
the parties shall have the right to examine a court expert apppointed
pursuant to the law.296
3. The Role of the Court Appointed Expert
in Fact Determination
Israel's impartial expert procedure has also created controversy re-
garding the expert's role in the determination of factual issues. The Ber-
enzon Committee recommended giving impartial medical experts the
power to determine the facts within their area of expertise.2 97 This pro-
posal which would allow the expert to arbitrate rather than serve merely
as a witness, has not been followed. Instead, the Israeli Supreme Court
has ruled that the judge, and not the expert, has the authority and obliga-
tion to make the decision regarding which version of the facts to be-
lieve.2 98 The Supreme Court has further ruled that judges may not divest
themselves of their obligation to determine and give judgment with re-
spect to each and every question in dispute in the matter before the
court.2 9 9
In this regard, the court has great discretion to decide whether or
not to accept the report of its expert. Thus, in 1985 the Supreme Court
upheld the trial court's adoption of its medical expert's finding regarding
the extent of the plaintiff's disability, even though the court's expert
found a lesser degree of disability than the defendant's expert had
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found." The Court held that even though the court, and not the expert,
must determine the facts, the court is entitled to adopt the findings of its
expert without setting forth its reasons for doing so.3°1 In so holding, the
Court indicated that, because the expert had been examined in court, the
judge had had an opportunity to weigh rather than merely blindly accept
the expert's opinion.302
IV. CONCLUSION
It is hardly surprising-although certainly not inevitable- that ex-
pert opinion is treated in accordance with the respective approaches to
fact determination in the common-law and civil-law systems. As we
have seen, in Anglo-American adjudication the expert is generally a par-
tisan witness-rather than a court appointed witness, advisor, or arbi-
ter-who gives oral testimony before the court and is subject to cross-
examination. On the Continent, where the judge has greater responsibil-
ity for developing the evidence and the process is essentially mediate,
unconcentrated, and written, experts are judicial officials who submit
written reports of their findings and are subject to little or no cross-
examination.
Despite the differences in treatment, the role of the expert and ex-
pert opinion has posed serious difficulties for each legal system. Under
the common-law system, the "battle" of partisan experts has often ob-
scured rather than clarified the issues at hand and has resulted in a
wasteful multiplication of effort and expense. Moreover, the expert has
not fit well within the rubric designed for ordinary witnesses. The result-
ing array of evidentiary rules has obstructed the transmission of expert
knowledge to the trier of fact and caused great frustration to experts un-
accustomed to the vagaries of the common-law adversary system. Judges
on the Continent have been inclined to overdelegate their responsibilities
to experts, who in turn frequently have been criticized for their lack of
competence. At the same time, courts have tended blindly to accept the
expert report without affording the parties a meaningful opportunity to
challenge its findings. In Israel the attempt to establish a "coexistence"
between a system of impartial court appointed experts and written expert
opinions, on the one hand, and the common-law system of partisan ex-
perts subject to cross-examination, on the other, has led to great uncer-
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tainty and, according to its critics, has complicated rather than simplified
the procedure for presenting expert opinion.
Despite the seriousness of the problem and longstanding criticism of
established procedures regarding experts, only incremental changes in
these procedures have been effected. What makes this essential conserva-
tism so striking is that basic reforms could be instituted by using and
expanding the mechanisms already in place within the applicable judicial
system. This, however, has not been done.
In England the Law Reform Committee, entrusted with proposing
solutions for the problem of the expert, recommended against the use of
the court's power to appoint expert witnesses and assessors because this
was deemed to conflict with the adversary system. In the United States,
Congress codified the court's inherent power to appoint court experts,
while expressing its intent that the court's power should be infrequently
invoked. For their part, American courts generally have refrained from
appointing impartial experts, either as witnesses or special masters, pre-
ferring instead the principle of adversarial responsibility for presenting
evidence. In France, legislative efforts to curb judicial delegation to ex-
perts have been side-stepped. Moreover, despite the express ideal of
party responsibility for presenting the evidence in civil cases, the litigants
have not been accorded meaningful rights to challenge the expert's report
by cross-examination or by having their own experts' reports given full
evidentiary consideration. Finally, in Israel the judges' and advisory
committees' repeated recommendations to restrict the parties' right to
call their own expert witnesses have been essentially ignored. As a result,
an Israeli judge may appoint an impartial expert, but generally can do
nothing to prevent the parties from calling their own experts as well,
unless the parties explicitly or implicitly waive their right to do so.
This Article is not concerned with whether or not, as a matter of
policy, more far-reaching reforms should be instituted. What is intrigu-
ing is why they have not been instituted in light of the widespread dissat-
isfaction with traditional procedures and the availability of existing
alternatives.
The reason for the absence of far-reaching reforms may be that any
fundamental change in the treatment of the expert would run counter to
deeply-held views regarding the role of the judicial system in society.
Common-law adjudication is a public ritual with antiauthoritarian over-
tones, in which the parties have their day in court and the jury, lay mag-
istrates, and judges are seen to embody the community sense of justice.
The expert in this morality play has been described as an authoritarian
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figure,3°3 whose predilection for fact determination on the basis of objec-
tive, empirical analysis, which is often expressed in terms that are in-
comprehensible to the average layperson, runs counter to the humanistic,
value-oriented, democratic foundation of Anglo-American adjudication.
Giving the expert a role alongside or instead of the judge or jury in decid-
ing the outcome of litigation could be viewed as alienating the dispute
resolution process from the common person. Furthermore, giving the ex-
pert such a role could be seen as an expropriation of the process by a
technocratic elite and as an elevation of the value of precision over the
value of justice.
On the Continent, where legal scholarship and substantive princi-
ples of law rather than the mechanics of adjudication serve as the focus
for legal culture, legislatures have been more willing than their English
and American counterparts to enact more comprehensive reforms. Nev-
ertheless, their efforts at reform, both in the area of the expert and else-
where have often given way to deeply rooted, historically-conditioned
attitudes and principles regarding the nature of adjudication. Proposals
to give the parties greater power to challenge the finding of a court ap-
pointed expert have conflicted with the deep-seated mistrust of adversary
self-interest, which expresses itself most strikingly in restrictions against
party discovery and presentation of witness testimony and in judicial dis-
regard for expert reports submitted by the parties.3" Efforts to limit ju-
dicial delegation of fact-finding duties have collided with the judiciary's
centuries-old reliance on the written reports of subordinates and with the
judiciary's preference for rendering a decision in full accord with legal
principles over accurately determining facts in a particular dispute.30 '
Finally, any proposal that the expert formally share in the judge's deci-
sion-making responsibility would run counter to the fundamental princi-
ples that the judge is the representative of the sovereign state and has the
absolute freedom to evaluate the evidence in accordance with his or her
intuitive conviction.
The ideological and cultural attributes of common-law and civil-law
adjudication have not entirely foreclosed the possibility for reform.
Common-law countries have enacted procedures for the court appoint-
ment of expert witnesses, the written submission of expert reports, and
the more rational, effective transmission of expert testimony. Civil-law
countries have increased judicial and party involvement in the process of
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expert investigation. Moreover, pressures for greater efficiency and ra-
tionality in adjudication have fostered change in other areas of procedure
and evidence and in the roles of the participants in the adjudicatory pro-
cess. Among these, as we have seen above, are the decline in the use of
the jury in civil cases in England, an increase in judicial case manage-
ment in the United States and elsewhere, and a greater emphasis on oral,
concentrated, and immediate procedures on the Continent. Furthermore,
additional changes have been prompted by developments in science and
technology-as is true to a large extent with the reforms regarding expert
opinion. These include, among others, the liberalization of evidentiary
restrictions on computer generated evidence30 6 and the use of teleconfer-
encing in lieu of face-to-face hearings.307
As a result of such changes, both common-law and civil-law adjudi-
cation have begun to vary, in some respects considerably, from their his-
torical prototypes. This in turn has produced a certain dissonance
between the traditional ideals of common-law and civil-law adjudication
and their actual practice.
The relationship between legal culture and adjudicatory procedure
is one of reciprocal interplay rather than unilateral determination. Thus,
common-law and civil-law attitudes regarding the nature of the judicial
system have evolved from, and been reinforced by, traditional procedures
for adjudicating disputes, just as such procedures have resulted from his-
torical attitudes about the nature of adjudication. Likewise, modern pro-
cedural reforms, such as those generated by the perceived need for more
effective treatment of expert opinion, while generally constrained by
traditional concepts regarding the purpose of adjudication and the
proper roles of its participants, will likely exert pressure on such con-
cepts. In the wake of such reforms and demands for greater accuracy
and efficiency in adjudicatory fact determination, jurists thus increas-
ingly will be called upon to examine and define the essential values of the
common-law and civil-law tradition that must continue to be reflected in
adjudicatory procedure.
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